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abstract
The paper analyzes the determinants of the optimal scope of incorporation in the presence
of bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs alone generate a non-trivial tradeo⁄ between the
bene￿t of coinsurance and the cost of risk contamination associated to joint ￿nancing corpo-
rate projects through debt. This tradeo⁄ is characterized for projects with binary returns,
depending on the distributional characteristics of returns (mean, variability, skewness, het-
erogeneity, correlation, and number of projects), the bankruptcy recovery rate, and the tax
rate advantage of debt relative to equity. Our testable predictions are broadly consistent
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http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/ottaviani/homepage.Consider a ￿rm that needs to ￿nance a number of risky projects from a competitive credit
market. The ￿rm has the choice of ￿nancing the projects either separately with a number
of independent loans or jointly with a single loan. With either ￿nancing regime, part of the
returns are lost to bankruptcy costs when creditors do not obtain full repayment. So when
is joint ￿nancing more pro￿table than separate ￿nancing? By answering this fundamental
corporate ￿nance question we can determine the pro￿tability of:
￿ mergers, which combine cash ￿ ows and the ￿nancing of otherwise separate corporations;
￿ holding companies, which protect the assets of individual subsidiaries from creditors￿
claims against one of the subsidiaries;
￿ spin-o⁄s, whereby divisions or subsidiaries are set up as independent corporations;
￿ project ￿nance and securitization, according to which projects are ￿nanced through
separate special purpose vehicles.
At least since Lewellen (1971), conventional wisdom in corporate ￿nance has largely
settled on the view that bankruptcy costs always generate positive ￿nancial synergies, so
that joint ￿nancing is more pro￿table than separate ￿nancing. According to this view,
conglomeration brings about a reduction in the probability of bankruptcy by allowing a ￿rm
to use the proceeds of a successful project to save an unsuccessful one which would have
otherwise failed. By aggregating imperfectly correlated cash ￿ ows, the argument goes, joint
￿nancing should reduce expected bankruptcy costs and increase borrowing capacity. As aptly
summarized by Brealey, Myers, and Allen￿ s (2006, page 880) textbook, ￿merging decreases
the probability of ￿nancial distress, other things equal. If it allows increased borrowing, and
increased value from the interest tax shields, there can be a net gain to the merger.￿
In this paper, we amend this conventional view by revisiting the purely ￿nancial e⁄ects
of conglomeration. We argue that bankruptcy costs alone create a non-trivial tradeo⁄ for
conglomeration, even abstracting from tax considerations and changes in borrowing capacity.
While the literature has mostly focused on the coinsurance bene￿ts of conglomeration, we
characterize the risk contamination losses that result when the logic of the conventional
argument is turned on its head. Through risk contamination, the failure of one project can
drag down another successful project that is ￿nanced jointly, thus increasing the probability
of bankruptcy. The additional bankruptcy costs associated with the project that is driven
into bankruptcy would have been saved if the projects had been ￿nanced separately. Precisely
because the dragged down project is otherwise healthy, risk contamination can be substantial.
1To illustrate the value of breaking up a conglomerate to avoid risk contamination losses,
consider the spin-o⁄ of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company from Nabisco￿ s food business
in 1999. As Steven F. Goldstone, chairman and chief executive o¢ cer of RJR Nabisco,
commented in the o¢ cial news release, this sale ￿paves the way for us to separate the
domestic tobacco business from the rest of our organization on a sound and prudent ￿nancial
basis.￿Similar considerations led many commentators to favor a split of UBS during the
recent ￿nancial crisis, as the troubled investment banking unit was dragging down the highly
pro￿table private banking business. As suggested by the Financial Times, UBS bene￿ted
from coinsurance gains (￿the main reason its investment bank had access to such cheap
funding during the boom that led to such huge losses was because UBS had a high credit
rating, supported by its private banking business￿ ) but ended up su⁄ering the e⁄ects of risk-
contamination (￿the losses have prompted clients to withdraw cash from UBS￿ s core wealth
management business￿ ).1
To best understand the determinants of the tradeo⁄between coinsurance and risk conta-
mination, we focus on the simplest setting in which each project has two possible realizations
of returns, either low or high. In the baseline model we constrain ￿nancing to be obtained
only through standard debt. The low return realization is insu¢ cient to cover the initial
investment outlay, thus generating the possibility of bankruptcy. Separate ￿nancing involves
a number of nonrecourse loans. This means that when the repayment obligation on one loan
is not met, creditors do not have access to the returns of other projects. Through joint
￿nancing, instead, the returns of multiple projects are conglomerated, so that bankruptcy
costs are only incurred when the sum of the returns of the projects falls below the overall
repayment obligation required by the creditors.
To develop an initial intuition, consider a setting with two ex ante identical and inde-
pendent projects, as in the baseline speci￿cation of our model. If the projects are ￿nanced
separately, each loan defaults when the corresponding project yields a low return. If, instead,
the projects are ￿nanced jointly, default occurs if the per-project repayment obligation is
higher than the average return of the two projects. Similar to the case of separate ￿nancing,
default occurs if the returns of both projects are low (bottom-left realization of the joint
distribution of returns in Figure 1) and does not occur if the returns of both projects are
high (top-right realization). The key to the comparison with separate ￿nancing is whether
1See ￿UBS does not have luxury of time before it splits up,￿ Financial Times, March 17, 2008, and
￿Integration loses its attraction,￿Financial Times, August 13, 2008.
2Figure 1. Joint distribution of returns. Each project i = 1;2 yields an independent
random return ri with a binary distribution. The return is either low, ri = rL > 0, with
probability 1 ￿ pi, or high, ri = rH > rL, with probability pi.
3or not the required repayment obligation can be met when one project yields a low return
and the other project yields a high return, as illustrated by the top-left and bottom-right
realizations in Figure 1. In turn, the repayment obligation is endogenously determined and
depends on the ￿nancing regime. In either regime, competition forces creditors to set the
repayment obligation at a level that allows the ￿rm to obtain the projects￿present value net
of the expected bankruptcy costs.
There are two scenarios. First, suppose that the repayment obligation is below the
average of the high and the low return, as illustrated by the dashed diagonal line in the
￿gure. In this case, the probability of bankruptcy is reduced with joint ￿nancing. Ex post,
a low-return project, which would have defaulted if it had been ￿nanced separately, is saved
if the other project yields a high return. Ex ante, the two projects coinsure each other and
the expected ine¢ ciency associated with bankruptcy is reduced. A higher probability of full
repayment forces creditors to reduce the repayment rates below the levels required under
separate ￿nancing. This coinsurance e⁄ect drives the classic logic of ￿good￿conglomeration
stressed by Lewellen (1971).
This result is reversed if the per-project repayment obligation is above the average of the
high and the low return, as illustrated by the dotted diagonal line in the ￿gure. In this second
scenario, the probability of bankruptcy is actually higher under joint ￿nancing! Ex-post, a
high-return project, which would have stayed a￿ oat if it had been ￿nanced separately, is now
dragged into bankruptcy when the other project has a low return. Ex ante, projects risk-
contaminate each other and the expected ine¢ ciency associated with bankruptcy is increased
with joint ￿nancing. If the bankruptcy recovery rate is low, competing creditors are forced
to increase repayment rates above the level that results under separate ￿nancing because
the loan will be repaid in full less often with joint ￿nancing. In this case, conglomeration is
￿bad￿due to risk contamination.
The thrust of our analysis consists of deriving conditions on the exogenous parameters
for good and bad conglomeration to arise. To this end, we ￿rst solve for the equilibrium
repayment obligations that result in the two ￿nancing regimes, and then determine the region
of parameters for which the borrower ￿nds separate ￿nancing more pro￿table than joint
￿nancing. In the context of the baseline model with two identical and independent projects,
we illustrate that separate ￿nancing can be optimal for empirically plausible parameter values
and derive a number of testable comparative statics predictions, such as the following:
￿ A reduction in the bankruptcy recovery rate decreases the pro￿tability of joint ￿nanc-
4ing. Given that the amount available to creditors following bankruptcy is lower when
bankruptcy costs are higher, the repayment obligation associated with joint ￿nancing
increases with the level of bankruptcy costs. It is then more di¢ cult for the repay-
ment obligation to be below the average of the high and the low return. Thus the
pro￿tability of joint ￿nancing is reduced. Consistent with this theoretical prediction,
Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that improvements in judicial e¢ ciency and creditor
rights signi￿cantly increase M&A activity and Subramanian, Tung, and Wang (2009)
￿nd that project ￿nance is more likely than corporate ￿nance in countries with less
e¢ cient bankruptcy procedures and weaker creditor rights.
￿ Joint ￿nancing is also less pro￿table when the projects are riskier, consistent with
project ￿nance being more widespread in riskier countries, as shown empirically by
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) among others.
￿ A mean-preserving increase in the negative skewness of the distribution of returns
makes joint ￿nancing less likely. This result explains why projects with negatively
skewed returns, due for example to environmental or expropriation risk, are likely to
be ￿nanced on a project basis (see Esty (2003)).
In the discussion so far we have compared the pro￿tability of separate and joint ￿nancing
when both ￿nancing regimes are feasible. In the paper, we also characterize situations in
which it is feasible to ￿nance projects with positive net present value either only separately
or only jointly. When the coinsurance e⁄ect prevails, joint ￿nancing increases the borrowing
capacity, resulting in projects that can be ￿nanced jointly but cannot be ￿nanced separately.
When risk contamination prevails, instead, joint ￿nancing decreases the borrowing capacity,
so that there are projects that can be ￿nanced separately but not jointly.
The paper also derives a number of useful managerial implications. We show that a rule of
thumb that prescribes adopting the ￿nancing regime associated with the lowest interest rate
can result in suboptimal decisions. We illustrate situations in which it is more pro￿table
for a ￿rm to ￿nance projects separately, even though joint ￿nancing at a lower interest
rate is feasible. Indeed, joint ￿nancing can have lower repayment rates despite having a
higher probability of bankruptcy. When the bankruptcy recovery rate is su¢ ciently high (or
equivalently, bankruptcy costs are su¢ ciently low), at any given exogenous repayment rate,
creditors expect to obtain more with joint ￿nancing than with separate ￿nancing because
bankruptcy happens more often. As a result, competition forces creditors to o⁄er a lower
5repayment rate to ￿rms that ￿nance projects jointly. This theoretical ￿nding can explain
why project ￿nance is used despite the fact that ￿project debt is often more expensive than
corporate debt,￿solving one of the ￿apparently counterintuitive features [of project ￿nance]￿
(Esty (2003)).
Next, we turn to the case of projects with heterogeneous distributions of returns. The
coinsurance and the risk contamination e⁄ects may be present simultaneously when two
heterogeneous projects are ￿nanced jointly. We characterize situations in which a ￿rst project
either saves or drags down a second project, depending on whether the ￿rst project succeeds
or fails. This situation arises when projects di⁄er in their riskiness, measured by second-
order stochastic dominance. We show that separate ￿nancing is relatively more pro￿table if
the di⁄erences in terms of risk pro￿les of the two projects are higher. This is in line with
empirical ￿ndings by Gorton and Souleles (2005) that riskier originator banks are more likely
to securitize.
In addition, we show that an increase in correlation in project returns tends to favor
separate ￿nancing. When projects￿return are perfectly negatively correlated, the risk conta-
mination e⁄ect is absent and the coinsurance e⁄ect is so strong so as to eliminate bankruptcy
altogether when projects are ￿nanced jointly, as it is also intuitive. Exploiting the logic of
the law of large numbers, we also show that when the number of projects becomes arbitrarily
large it is optimal to ￿nance them all jointly. Armstrong (1999) derives a similar result in
the industrial organization literature on product bundling.
We also investigate the robustness of our results to di⁄erent speci￿cations for the struc-
ture of bankruptcy costs. In the baseline model, bankruptcy costs are proportional to the
value of the assets under bankruptcy, as is commonly assumed in the theoretical and em-
pirical literature. The logic of risk contamination also applies if, instead, bankruptcy costs
depend on the number of projects that go bankrupt rather than on the value of assets under
bankruptcy. Actually, we show that separate ￿nancing is then optimal for a larger set of
parameters because it becomes easier to obtain joint ￿nancing, but only at the rate for which
intermediate bankruptcy occurs. On the other hand, as it is intuitive to expect, joint ￿nanc-
ing is optimal for a larger set of parameters when there are economies of scale in bankruptcy
costs, according to which per-project bankruptcy costs are lower when projects are ￿nanced
jointly.
In the baseline model, we restrict ￿nancing to be obtained through debt. Note that debt
is the optimal contractual arrangement if returns are privately observed by the borrower
6and can be veri￿ed by creditors only by inducing bankruptcy and incurring the bankruptcy
costs. The optimality of debt follows immediately from a classic result derived by Townsend
(1979), Diamond (1984), and Gale and Hellwig (1985) in the context of the costly state
veri￿cation model. We also extend the analysis to allow ￿nancing through equity in addition
to debt. As in the tradeo⁄ theory of capital structure, equity saves on bankruptcy costs
but is subject to higher taxation. When the possibility of equity ￿nancing is added, debt
and equity are optimal contractual arrangements once we assume that equity investors are
subject to higher taxation than debt, but are able to observe returns directly without the
need of incurring veri￿cation/bankruptcy costs.
Turning to the choice of separate and joint ￿nancing in the model with debt and equity,
we show that if the incremental tax on equity (or, equivalently, the tax advantage of debt) is
su¢ ciently low, joint ￿nancing is inconsequential because bankruptcy can be avoided alto-
gether with joint as well as with separate ￿nancing. More interestingly, if the tax di⁄erential
is intermediate, joint ￿nancing is pro￿table in more cases than in the baseline model be-
cause, by using equity, it becomes possible to obtain a repayment rate that avoids default
when one project yields a high return and the other project yields a low return. Finally,
if the tax di⁄erential is su¢ ciently high, separate and joint ￿nancing are pro￿table in the
same situations as in the baseline model, as no equity is used in either ￿nancing regime.
In our model, when ￿nancing projects separately is strictly more pro￿table than ￿nancing
them jointly, ￿nancing is exclusively in debt. Equity is more expensive and it is only used
if it helps to obtain a repayment rate that decreases the probability of default, in which
case joint ￿nancing is optimal. The exclusive use of debt in separate ￿nance, which arises
endogenously in our model, is consistent with the many empirical studies that ￿nd that a
large proportion of funding in project ￿nance is in the form of debt (see e.g. Kleimeier and
Megginson (2000)).
In terms of the theoretical literature in corporate ￿nance, we depart from Modigliani and
Miller￿ s (1958) world without ￿nancial synergies by introducing bankruptcy costs. In the
absence of bankruptcy costs, joint and separate ￿nancing are equivalent (see, for example,
Levy and Sarnat (1970)). By clarifying the conditions for the value of conglomeration in
the presence of bankruptcy costs, this paper contributes to a voluminous literature on the
analysis of purely ￿nancial motives for mergers. In his discussion to Lewellen (1971), Higgins
(1971) notes that joint ￿nancing also a⁄ects the riskiness of the lender￿ s returns; hence we
abstract from risk concerns by assuming risk neutrality. Scott (1977) and Sarig (1985) show
7that if cash ￿ ows can be negative, a ￿rm can exploit the shelter of limited liability by
￿nancing projects through separate corporations. In our analysis we explicitly abstract from
this limited liability e⁄ect, so that the ￿nancing regime a⁄ects only the payo⁄ of the ￿rm
and its creditors, without having any impact on the payo⁄ of third parties.2
Our results are most closely related to three recent contributions. First, Winton (1999)
studies whether ￿nancial institutions should specialize and lend to one sector or diversify
and lend to several sectors. The third case of Winton￿ s (1999) Proposition 3.1 discusses
a situation in which a bank prefers to specialize even though a lower interest rate can
be obtained through diversi￿cation. Our Proposition 4 uncovers conditions for a similar
e⁄ect in the context of a simpler model. More generally, our paper unearths the logic and
characterizes the more general tradeo⁄ behind Winton￿ s earlier example.
Second, Inderst and M￿ller (2003) (and Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005)) analyze ￿-
nancial conglomeration in a two-project version of Bolton and Scharfstein￿ s (1990) dynamic
model of debt. In their dynamic setting, ￿nancing two projects within the same corporation
can reduce the ￿rm￿ s ability to borrow when the ￿rm is able to ￿nance follow-up investments
internally without returning to the external capital market. In our model, bad conglomer-
ation arises because of bankruptcy costs, a channel from which Inderst and M￿ller (2003)
abstract.
Third, Leland (2007) compares the pro￿tability of separate and joint ￿nancing for a
borrower who trades o⁄ bankruptcy costs with tax shields by adjusting the mix of debt
and equity. In the baseline version of our model, we consider ￿xed-investment projects that
must be ￿nanced only with debt and thus we explicitly rule out the possibility of increasing
leverage and re-optimizing the capital structure. Our analysis discovers situations in which
separate ￿nancing is optimal even when the amount borrowed through debt does not depend
on whether projects are ￿nanced jointly or separately. This result was not envisioned by
Leland￿ s (2007) numerical analysis, as explained in detail in Supplementary Appendix B.3
2A number of papers (e.g., Higgins and Schall (1975) and Kim and McConnell (1977)) have analyzed the
e⁄ect of the current capital structure on merger incentives. These papers noted that, while mergers may
increase total ￿rm value, bondholders may gain at the expense of shareholders. We abstract from such a
distributional con￿ ict among (cashless) stakeholders, by considering the ex ante choice of corporate structure
by shareholders and forcing bondholders to compete and therefore obtain no surplus.
3Our results are also very di⁄erent from those of Sha⁄er (1994), who studies the e⁄ect of joint ￿nancing
on the probability of joint failure. Instead, we compare the ￿rm￿ s expected payo⁄ when the interest rate is
endogenously determined by competition among creditors.
8The paper proceeds as follows. Section I formulates the model. Focusing on the baseline
version of the model with two identically and independently distributed projects, ￿nanced
with debt only, and with proportional bankruptcy rates, Section II analyzes the conditions
setting apart good from bad conglomeration and performs comparative statics with respect
to the distribution (mean, variance, and skewness) of returns and the bankruptcy recovery
rate. Section III turns to the case of projects with heterogeneous returns. Section IV
shows that an increase in the correlation of returns favors separate ￿nancing. Section V
demonstrates that joint ￿nancing is optimal when the number of projects is su¢ ciently
large. Section VI argues that our results are robust to how bankruptcy costs are modeled.
Section VII extends the analysis to a setting in which equity is also available and is taxed at
a higher rate than debt. Section VIII concludes with a summary and a discussion of avenues
for future research. Appendix A collects the proofs omitted from the text. Supplementary
Appendix B characterizes conditions for bad conglomeration to result in a variant of the
model in which projects have continuous returns.
I. Baseline Model
This section formulates the simplest possible model to analyze how multiple projects
should be optimally ￿nanced in the presence of bankruptcy costs. In the rest of the paper
we derive results for special cases or extensions of this basic model.
A risk-neutral ￿rm has access to n projects. Project i requires at t = 1 an investment
outlay normalized to I = 1 and yields at t = 2 a random payo⁄ or return ri with a binary
distribution: the return is either low, ri = ri
L > 0, with probability 1￿pi, or high, ri = ri
H >
ri
L, with probability pi. Each project has a positive net present value, (1 ￿ pi)ri
L+piri
H￿1 >
0. The low return is insu¢ cient to cover the initial investment outlay, ri
L < 1. Returns are
possibly correlated across projects.
Before raising external ￿nance, the ￿rm chooses how to group projects into corporations,
or equivalently into separate nonrecourse loans. This means that investors in each corpora-
tion have access to the returns of all projects in that corporation, but they do not have access
to the returns of the projects in the other corporations set up by the ￿rm. Financing for
each corporation can be obtained in a competitive credit market. For notational simplicity,
we stipulate that the ￿rm seeks ￿nancing only when expecting to obtain a strictly positive
expected payo⁄.
Creditors are risk neutral and lend money through standard debt contracts. Without loss
9of generality we normalize the risk-free interest rate to rf = 0.4 Therefore, creditors expect
to make zero expected pro￿ts. This is equivalent to assuming that each corporation makes
a take-it-or-leave-it repayment o⁄er to a single creditor for each loan j, promising to repay
r￿
j at t = 2 for each unit borrowed at t = 1.5 Thus r￿
j denotes the promised repayment per
project. According to our accounting convention, the corporation￿ s repayment obligation
comprises the amount borrowed as well as net interest.6
Creditors are repaid in full when the total realized return of the projects pledged is
su¢ cient to cover the promised repayment. If instead the total realized return falls short
of the repayment obligation, the corporation defaults and the ownership of the projects￿
realized returns is transferred to the creditor. Following default, the creditor is only able to
recover a fraction ￿ 2 [0;1] of the realized returns r, so that the bankruptcy costs following
default are equal to (1 ￿ ￿)r. The bankruptcy recovery rate ￿ measures the e¢ ciency of
the bankruptcy process and is industry speci￿c.7 In Section VI, we analyze alternative
speci￿cations for bankruptcy costs which allow for ￿xed costs and economies of scale.
For the baseline speci￿cation of the model we restrict external ￿nancing to be obtained
through debt. Note that debt is the optimal contractual arrangement if returns are pri-
vately observed by the borrower and can be veri￿ed by creditors only at a cost equal to the
bankruptcy cost. This result follows immediately from classic analyses of the costly state
veri￿cation model (see Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), and Gale and Hellwig (1985)).
In Section VII, we extend the model to also allow for ￿nancing through tax-disadvantaged
equity and we show that full debt ￿nancing is optimal if taxes are su¢ ciently high. In the
context of that more general model, we characterize how the tradeo⁄ between debt and
equity in￿ uences the decision of whether projects should be ￿nanced separately or jointly.
Until then we mute the choice between equity and debt and thus focus on the conglomeration
decision when debt is the only source of ￿nancing that is available.
4To see that I = 1 and rf = 0 are innocuous normalizations, suppose that the investment outlay is
equal to I and that the investors￿required interest rate is rf > 0. Denoting the random cash ￿ ow by Ri,
the project￿ s return in the model can be reinterpreted in terms of percentage gross return for each unit of
period-2 equivalent outlay: ri = Ri=[I(1+rf)]. Thus without loss of generality we can set I = 1 and rf = 0.
5Thus, for the case in which each loan (or corporation) is ￿nanced by multiple creditors, we implicitly
assume that there are no coordination failures across the creditors who syndicate the same loan.
6The net interest rate i satis￿es 1 + i = r￿
j and therefore the repayment obligation can be interpreted as
the gross interest rate.
7For estimates of bankruptcy costs and other costs of ￿nancial distress across industries see, for example,
Warner (1977), Weiss (1990), and Korteweg (2007).
10II. Two Identical and Independent Projects
This section analyzes the simplest possible speci￿cation of the model to develop our main
insight. The ￿rm has access to two identically and independently distributed projects. Each
project i yields a low return ri
L ￿ rL with probability 1 ￿ pi ￿ 1 ￿ p and a high return
ri
H ￿ rH > rL with probability pi ￿ p.
In Section A we proceed to examine the conditions for when the borrower is able to
￿nance the two projects separately and jointly. In Section B we compare the pro￿tability
of separate and joint ￿nancing, when they are both feasible. In Section C we illustrate that
separate ￿nancing can be optimal for empirically plausible parameter values. In Section D
we characterize the e⁄ect of conglomeration on the ￿rm￿ s borrowing capacity. In Section E
we derive a set of comparative statics predictions for the occurrence of joint and separate
￿nancing. Finally, in Section F we show that the ￿nancing option with the lowest repayment
rate is not necessarily optimal.
A. Financing Conditions
Consider ￿rst the possibility of ￿nancing the two projects through two separate non-
recourse loans or, equivalently, through two di⁄erent limited liability corporations. Given
that the two projects are ex ante identical, the ￿nancing of each project, if possible, takes
place at the same rate. Such rate r￿
i must satisfy rL < 1 < r￿
i < rH, so that there is a
positive probability that the loan is not repaid in full. Indeed, the ￿rm would not accept to
be ￿nanced at a rate above rH, because this would result in zero payo⁄ for the ￿rm. Also,
the rate must be above 1 because at rates at or below 1 the creditor would make negative
expected pro￿ts (by obtaining a return never above the investment outlay of 1 and strictly
below 1 with strictly positive probability) and therefore would not be willing to extend the
loan.
Given that the credit market is competitive, creditors must make zero expected pro￿ts.
Thus the repayment requested by the creditor, r￿
i, is such that the gross expected proceeds,
pr￿
i + ￿(1 ￿ p)rL, are equal to the initial investment outlay 1. As a result, each project can




1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)rL
p
￿ rH: (1)
The repayment obligation, which is fully paid only in the case of a high return, is equal to
11the investment outlay, 1, less the expected proceeds from bankruptcy, ￿(1 ￿ p)rL, divided
by the probability of staying a￿ oat, p. Intuitively, the creditor needs to recover the expected
shortfall in the event of bankruptcy from the event in which the project yields a high return.
As a result, r￿
i > 1.
Next, consider joint ￿nancing of the two projects through a single loan or, equivalently,
within the same corporation. Denote by r￿
m the equilibrium repayment obligation per unit
of investment, so that 2r￿
m is the total repayment promised to the creditor in return for
the initial ￿nancing of the two projects, 2I = 2. Two cases need to be distinguished,
depending on whether or not the required repayment rate induces bankruptcy in the case
with ￿intermediate returns,￿when one project yields a high return while the other project
yields a low return.
Suppose ￿rst that the equilibrium repayment rate r￿




that there is no default with intermediate returns. As a result, the probability of default is
reduced to (1 ￿ p)
2. Substituting again in the expected creditor pro￿ts, the borrower would




1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2 rL





Suppose now that the equilibrium repayment rate r￿￿




and therefore the borrower defaults in the event of a high and a low return. Hence, default





1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ p)(prH + rL)
p2 ￿ rH: (3)
Since the borrower￿ s expected pro￿ts for a given distribution are decreasing in the equilibrium
rate, if both conditions (2) and (3) are satis￿ed, the borrower prefers rate r￿
m to rate r￿￿
m.8
Summarizing the results so far, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Two independent and identical projects can be ￿nanced separately if and
only if condition (1) is satis￿ed, in which case the equilibrium rate is r￿
i. Projects can be
￿nanced jointly if and only if conditions (2) or (3) are satis￿ed. If condition (2) is satis￿ed,
the equilibrium rate is r￿
m, and if it is not satis￿ed, the equilibrium rate is r￿￿
m.
8It is straightforward to show that if r￿
m > (rH + rL)=2, then r￿￿
m > (rH + rL)=2. Therefore, if it is not
possible to obtain r￿
m, then we can disregard the r￿￿
m > (rH + rL)=2 constraint.
12Figure 2 depicts how per-project expected returns are divided between the borrower
and the creditor in the three scenarios described by Proposition 1. The project￿ s expected
return is equal to the area above the distribution function (and up to 1). When the two
projects are ￿nanced separately, the return of each project is a binary random variable with
a cumulative distribution represented in Panel (a). When the two projects are bundled and
￿nanced jointly, there are three possible realized returns. Panels (b) and (c) display the
cumulative distributions of the (per-project) returns resulting from joint ￿nancing for two
di⁄erent examples. In each graph the dashed distribution corresponds to the returns resulting
from separate ￿nancing. Note that the distribution of (per-project) returns with separate
￿nancing is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution with joint ￿nancing. Intuitively,
joint ￿nancing steepens the return distribution around the center, (rH + rL)=2, by inducing
an anti-clockwise rotation.
For any given repayment rate r, the net expected return for the borrower in the three
panels corresponds to the area above the cumulative distribution of (per-project) returns at
r, F (r), and to the right of r (in light gray). The gross expected return of the creditor is
the sum of (i) the area above F(r) and to the left of r (in gray) and (ii) a fraction ￿ of
the area below F(r) and above the distribution function (in black). The area (i) is equal to
pr, which is the full repayment of the outstanding obligation multiplied by the probability
that the project stays a￿ oat. The area (ii) is equal to ￿(1 ￿ p)rL, capturing the expected
returns obtained in case of bankruptcy. The remaining fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the black area is
equal to the expected bankruptcy costs. This is also equal to the di⁄erence between the net
present value of the ￿rm, the area above the distribution function and below 1, and the sum
of creditor￿ s and borrower￿ s pro￿ts.
The equilibrium rate r￿ in the three panels is such that the gross expected return of the
creditor is equal to 1. Projects can be ￿nanced separately as long as the creditor￿ s gross
returns at a rate rH are greater than 1, as in Panel (a). Projects can be ￿nanced jointly at a
rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy as long as the per-project creditor returns at the
center or crossing point, (rH + rL)=2, are greater than 1, as in Panel (b). Projects can only
be ￿nanced jointly at a rate that does not avoid intermediate bankruptcy if the per-project
creditor returns at (rH + rL)=2 are lower than 1 and at rH are greater than 1, as in Panel
(c).
13Figure 2. Distribution of Returns. The area above the distribution function represents the
project￿ s expected return. For a given repayment rate r, the net expected return for the borrower
corresponds to the area above the distribution function and to the right of r (in light gray). The
gross expected return for the creditor is the sum of (i) the area above F(r) and to the left of r (in
gray) and (ii) a fraction ￿ of the area below F(r) and above the distribution function (in black).
The equilibrium rate r￿ is such that the gross expected return for the creditor is equal to 1. Projects
can be ￿nanced separately if the creditor￿ s gross expected return at the rate rH is greater than 1,
as in Panel (a). Projects can be ￿nanced jointly at a rate below the crossing point if the per-project
creditor returns at (rH + rL)=2 are greater than 1, as in Panel (b). Projects can only be ￿nanced
jointly at a rate above the crossing point if the creditor￿ s per-project returns at (rH + rL)=2 are
smaller than 1 and at rH are greater than 1, as in Panel (c). The parameters used in panels (a)
and (b) are p = 0:6; rL = 0:5, rH = 2:5 and ￿ = 0:8 and in panel (c) p = 0:65; rL = 0:5,
rH = 1:5 and ￿ = 0:9:
14B. Good and Bad Conglomeration
When both separate and joint ￿nancing are feasible, which regime is more pro￿table and
thus optimal for the borrower? Obviously, in the absence of bankruptcy costs (i.e., when
￿ = 1) the borrower is indi⁄erent between ￿nancing the projects separately or jointly. The
next proposition states the gains and losses when ￿ < 1.
Proposition 2: When the borrower can ￿nance two independent and identical projects
separately as well as jointly:
(a) If condition (2) is satis￿ed, it is optimal to ￿nance the projects jointly to enjoy the
coinsurance gains: p(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)rL.
(b) If condition (2) is not satis￿ed, it is optimal to ￿nance the projects separately to avoid
the risk contamination losses: p(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)rH.
Intuitively, when the borrower obtains a rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy, the
probability of default under joint ￿nancing is lower than under separate ￿nancing. The low-
return project is saved from default when the other project yields a high return, thereby
reducing the ine¢ ciency associated with bankruptcy. Per-project expected savings when the
projects are ￿nanced jointly rather than separately￿ the ￿coinsurance e⁄ect￿ ￿ are equal to
the probability that the ￿rst project yields a low return while the second project yields a
high return, p(1 ￿ p), multiplied by the losses avoided due to bankruptcy costs, (1 ￿ ￿)rL.
Graphically, per-project savings due to the coinsurance e⁄ect associated with joint ￿nancing
are represented by a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of the dark gray area in Panel (a) of Figure 3.
If, instead, the borrower obtains a joint rate that does not avoid intermediate bankruptcy,
a project with low return drags down the other project, increasing the probability of default.
Per-project expected losses when projects are ￿nanced jointly rather than separately￿ the
￿risk contamination e⁄ect￿ ￿ are equal to the probability that the ￿rst project yields a high
return while the second project yields a low return, p(1 ￿ p), multiplied by the additional
losses in bankruptcy costs incurred, (1￿￿)rH. Graphically, the per-project costs due to the
risk contamination e⁄ect associated with joint ￿nancing are represented by a fraction (1￿￿)
of the darker gray area in Panel (b) of Figure 3.
The key is whether the equilibrium repayment rate for joint ￿nancing is below or above
the crossing point, (rH + rL)=2. Notice that the crossing point is not necessarily at the
mean. In particular, if p > 1=2, so that the distribution is skewed to the left (i.e., returns
15Figure 3. Good and Bad Conglomeration. Panel (a): Projects can be ￿nanced jointly at
a rate below the crossing point. The reduction in expected bankruptcy costs obtained with joint
rather than separate ￿nancing (co-insurance e⁄ect) is equal to the darker gray area. Panel (b):
Projects cannot be ￿nanced jointly at a rate below the crossing point. The increase in expected
bankruptcy costs obtained with joint rather than separate ￿nancing (risk contamination e⁄ect) is
equal to the darker gray area. The parameters used in panel (a) are p = 0:6; rL = 0:5, rH = 2:5
and ￿ = 0:8 and in panel (b) p = 0:65; rL = 0:5, rH = 1:5 and ￿ = 0:9:
are negatively skewed), the crossing point is below the mean. As a result, equilibrium rates
above the crossing point are consistent with a probability of default below 50%. The resulting
default probabilities would be 1￿p for separate ￿nancing and 1￿p2 for joint ￿nancing, which
for a high enough p may be very low, as illustrated in the following numerical example.
C. Illustration
We now illustrate how conglomeration can result in an increase in expected bankruptcy
costs for empirically plausible parameter values under the maintained assumption that re-
turns are binary. To this end, Figure 4 reports a calibration of the four parameters (rH, rL,
p, and ￿) of the baseline version of the model with separate ￿nancing. As representative
values, we set:
(i) the probability of bankruptcy at 10% by using Longsta⁄, Mittal, and Neis (2005) estimate
for bonds by BBB rated ￿rms with a ￿ve-year horizon;
(ii) the internal rate of return at an average of 15% and 20%;
(iii) the bankruptcy recovery rate at 65% from Alderson and Betker (1995); and
(iv) bankruptcy costs as a fraction of a ￿rm￿ s value at 10%, at the low end of Altman￿ s
16VARIABLE PARAMETRIZATION VALUE
Probability of bankruptcy 1 ￿ p 0:10
Internal rate of return
prH+(1￿p)￿rL￿1
1 0:175
Bankruptcy recovery rate ￿ 0:65
Bankruptcy costs as a fraction of ￿rm￿ s value
(1￿￿)rL
prH+(1￿p)￿rL 0:10
Figure 4. Parameter Calibration.
(1984) estimate of 11￿ 17% for bankruptcy costs as a fraction of ￿rm value up to three years
before default and more conservative than Korteweg￿ s (forthcoming) estimate of 15￿ 30% of
￿rm value at the point of bankruptcy.
The calibrated values are rH = 1:28; rL = 0:34; p = 0:9; ￿ = 0:65, for which it is feasible
to ￿nance the projects separately, since r￿
i = 1:09 < 1:28 = rH, as well as jointly, since
r￿￿
m = 1:12 < 1:28 = rH, but not at the rate below the crossing point, because r￿
m = 1:01 >
0:81 = (rH + rL)=2. Thus, separate ￿nancing is more pro￿table than joint ￿nancing. In this
illustration, the risk contamination e⁄ect identi￿ed in Proposition 2 is p(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)rH =
0:04, 4% of the investment outlay I = 1, corresponding to 0:04=0:175 ￿ 23% of the project￿ s
net present value.
D. Borrowing Capacity
So far we have compared the pro￿tability of separate and joint ￿nancing when both
￿nancing regimes are feasible. As we have seen in Section A, there are situations in which
it is feasible to ￿nance projects with positive net present value either only separately or
only jointly. Thus, conglomeration does not necessarily increase the ￿rm￿ s ability to ￿nance
projects.
Proposition 3: Consider two identical and independent projects:
(a) If condition (2) is satis￿ed, there are projects that can be ￿nanced jointly but not sepa-
rately.
(b) If condition (2) is not satis￿ed, any project that can be ￿nanced jointly can be ￿nanced
separately and there are projects that can only be ￿nanced separately.
When the coinsurance e⁄ect prevails, there are projects that can be ￿nanced jointly
17but cannot be ￿nanced separately. In this ￿rst case, conglomeration increases the ￿rm￿ s
borrowing capacity, as in Lewellen (1971). However, when risk contamination prevails, joint
￿nancing decreases the ￿rm￿ s borrowing capacity, so that there are projects that can be
￿nanced separately but not jointly.
E. Testable Predictions
We now derive comparative statics predictions with respect to changes in the character-
istics of the projects: the recovery rates and the distribution of returns (mean, variability,
and skewness). For each attribute, we study whether separate or joint ￿nancing is optimal
for a larger range of the remaining parameters. Again, the key aspect is whether it is easier
or more di¢ cult to obtain a repayment rate for joint ￿nancing below the crossing point. In
turn, this depends on how parameter changes a⁄ect the crossing point as well as the returns
the ￿rm can pledge to the creditors at that point.
At the same time, we contrast our predictions with those from existing theories and dis-
cuss how our predictions on joint and separate ￿nancing match existing empirical evidence.
Support for the desirability of joint ￿nancing can be found on the occurrence of mergers,
especially conglomerate mergers, whereas support for separate ￿nancing can be found in
spin-o⁄s. As also argued by Leland (2007), structured ￿nance, and in particular asset se-
curitization and project ￿nance, are other means to separate activities from originating or
sponsoring organizations. A bankruptcy-remote special purpose entity or vehicle (SPE or
SPV) raises funds to compensate the sponsor by selling securities that are collateralized by
the cash ￿ ows of the transferred assets. From an analytical perspective, these entities have
the key features of a separate corporations.
Prediction 1: For higher bankruptcy costs (lower ￿) then (a) both joint and separate
￿nancing can be obtained for a smaller region of parameters and (b) joint ￿nancing is optimal
for a smaller region of the remaining parameters.
Higher bankruptcy costs decrease pledgeable returns (the sum of the gray, and a fraction
1 ￿ ￿ of the black area in Figure 1), since the recovered returns in case of default are lower
(higher discount in the black area). Since the bankruptcy costs do not a⁄ect the crossing
point, (rH +rL)=2, ￿nancing at a rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy is more di¢ cult
and thus joint ￿nance is less likely. To the best of our knowledge, this prediction had not
been formulated before.
18Still, this prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence that suggests that merger
activity is less likely and project ￿nance more likely in countries with weaker investor pro-
tection. Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that improvements in judicial e¢ ciency and creditor
rights signi￿cantly increase M&A activity. Comparing the incidence of bank loans for project
￿nance with regular corporate loans for large investments, Subramanian, Tung, and Wang
(2009) show that project ￿nancing is more likely in countries with less e¢ cient bankruptcy
procedures and weaker creditor rights. Both measures of investor protection decrease bank-
ruptcy costs and should make, according to our model, separate ￿nancing (project ￿nance)
less likely and joint ￿nancing (mergers) more likely.
Prediction 2: For higher probability of a high return (higher p) then (a) both joint and
separate ￿nancing can be obtained for a larger region of parameters and (b) joint ￿nancing
is optimal for a larger region of the remaining parameters.
If the probability of a high return increases, it becomes easier to ￿nance projects as
well as to ￿nance at a repayment rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy. Graphically,
this lowers all the horizontal lines in Figure 2, thereby increasing the expected value, the
area above the distribution, without a⁄ecting the crossing point. Financing is eased and,
in particular, ￿nancing at a rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy, because the expected
return pledgeable to creditors also increases.
This prediction contrasts with that of Inderst and M￿ller (2003). In their model, bet-
ter projects are better kept separate to avoid self-￿nancing and thus commit to return to
the capital market. The two e⁄ects might explain the con￿ icting empirical evidence on
the productivity of conglomerate ￿rms. While Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) ￿nd that
conglomerate ￿rms, for all but the smallest ￿rms in their sample, are less productive than
single-segment ￿rms, Schoar (2002) ￿nds that the productivity of plants in conglomerate
￿rms is higher than in stand-alone ￿rms.9
During booms, projects might have a higher expectation across-the-board. Our prediction
9Still, Shoar (2002) ￿nds that conglomerates are less valued than focused ￿rms (the so-called market
diversi￿cation discount), and argues that the discrepancy can be attributed to conglomerates leaving more
rents to workers. A number of papers have also argued that the diversi￿cation discount could also be spurious,
because of measurement problems and selection biases. For example, Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002)
show that acquirers￿excess values decline because the business units acquired are already discounted, thus
explaining the diversi￿cation discount with a self-selection argument. See also Campa and Kedia (2002),
Villalonga (2004), and Custodio (2009).
19would then be consistent with a large body of empirical evidence that shows that merger
activity usually heats up during economic booms and slows down in recessions (see, for
example, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)). Similarly, Cantor and Demsetz (1993) show that
o⁄-balance sheet activity (separate ￿nancing) grows following a recession.
Prediction 3: Consider the e⁄ect of a mean-preserving spread in the project￿ s return
consisting of an increase in the high return rH and a reduction in the low return rL so as
to maintain the mean return constant. Then, there exists p < 1=2 such that the region of
parameters for which joint ￿nancing is optimal decreases if and only if p > p.
That is, a mean preserving spread in the distribution of returns favors separate ￿nancing
as long as the distribution of returns is not too positively skewed. If the distribution is
symmetric (p = 1=2), a mean preserving spread increases rH by as much as it reduces rL.
While the crossing point is una⁄ected, the joint ￿nancing rate that avoids intermediate
bankruptcy becomes more di¢ cult to obtain because the low return is even lower and the
pledgeable returns before the crossing point are lower. In the graph, the black area shrinks.
If the distribution of returns is negatively skewed (p > 1=2), the crossing point is decreased
and it becomes even more di¢ cult to obtain joint ￿nancing below the crossing point.10
This prediction is consistent with a similar prediction obtained in Leland (2007). Empir-
ical support can be found in the project ￿nance literature. Kleimeier and Megginson (1999),
for example, ￿nd that project ￿nance loans are far more likely to be extended to borrowers
in riskier countries, particularly countries with higher political and economic risks. They
claim that: ￿As a whole, these geographic lending patterns are consistent with the widely
held belief that project ￿nance is a particularly appropriate method of funding projects in
relatively risky (non-OECD) countries.￿
Prediction 4: Consider the e⁄ect of a mean-preserving increase in negative skewness in
the project￿ s return consisting of a reduction in the low return level rL and an increase in the
probability of high return p so as to maintain the mean return constant. Then, it becomes
optimal to ￿nance the projects jointly for a smaller region of parameters if and only if the
high return level rH is su¢ ciently large.
10To maintain the mean constant, a given increase in rH must be combined with a larger decrease in rL,
resulting in a reduction in the crossing point. Formally, from r0
H = rH + " and r0
L = rL ￿ "p=(1 ￿ p), we
have (r0
H + r0
L)=2 = (rH + rL)=2 ￿ "(2p ￿ 1)=2(1 ￿ p).
20An increase in the negative skewness has two con￿ icting e⁄ects. On the one hand, as rL
decreases the crossing point is reduced and the returns in case of bankruptcy are lower, so
that joint ￿nancing at the rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy becomes more di¢ cult.
On the other hand, as p increases so as to keep the mean constant, the probability that
both projects￿returns are low is reduced, so that it becomes easier to ￿nance the projects at
the rate avoiding intermediate bankruptcy. Graphically, the black area (creditor￿ s expected
returns in case of default) becomes less wide and less high and the gray area (creditor￿ s
expected returns if staying a￿ oat) is less wide but also higher at the crossing point. If rH
is su¢ ciently high, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates and separation is more likely to be optimal.
Indeed, for a given increase in p, one needs a higher reduction in rL to ensure a constant
mean.
We can ￿nd support for this prediction in the literature on project ￿nance and hedge
funds. Esty (2003) shows that project ￿nance is used when the possibility of total loss exists,
due to environmental and expropriation risks. This type of risks generate returns with large
negative skewness, as opposed to other type of risks such as exchange rate, throughput,
quantity or price risks, which can go either way. Hedge funds returns also have negative
skewness and, at the same time, they make heavy use of o⁄-balance sheet instruments.
Indeed, Brooks and Kat (2002) and Malkiel and Saha (2004) show that hedge fund indices
exhibit considerable negative skewness. At the same time, hedge funds rely heavily on
o⁄-balance sheet techniques. For example, before its demise in 1990, Long Term Capital
Management￿ s balance sheet amounted to $125 billion but its o⁄-balance sheet positions
had a notional amount of $1.25 trillion.
F. Managerial Implications
We now show that the option with the lowest repayment rate does not necessarily entail
the lowest likelihood of bankruptcy and is thus not necessarily optimal. Thus borrowers
would be misguided by choosing the ￿nancing regime that leads to the lowest interest rate.
The following proposition characterizes when it is more pro￿table to ￿nance projects sepa-
rately, even though joint ￿nancing is available at a lower rate.
Proposition 4: Separate ￿nancing is optimal even though it results in higher repayment
rates if and only if (i) condition (3) is satis￿ed but condition (2) is not satis￿ed and (ii)
￿ [prH + (1 ￿ p)rL] > 1.
21Suppose that the borrower has the choice of ￿nancing the projects independently and
jointly, although only at a rate with intermediate bankruptcy. In this region, the low return
project drags down the high-return project and it is more pro￿table to ￿nance projects sep-
arately. Joint ￿nancing, however, can have lower repayment rates despite having a higher
probability of bankruptcy. When the bankruptcy recovery rate is su¢ ciently high (or equiv-
alently, bankruptcy costs su¢ ciently low), at any given exogenous repayment rate creditors
expect to obtain more with joint ￿nancing because bankruptcy happens more often and they
thus o⁄er lower rates. The borrower might feel tempted to ￿nance the projects jointly, but
this is suboptimal. Low interest rate associated with joint ￿nancing here are deceptively
attractive. Even though conglomeration looks good, it is unambiguously bad.
The logic can be further illustrated by Panel (b) of Figure 3. For an (exogenous) re-
payment rate above the crossing point, r > (rH + rL)=2, as the one depicted, the creditor￿ s
expected returns might be higher if projects are ￿nanced jointly in spite of the increased
occurrence of bankruptcy. Indeed, with joint ￿nancing, the creditor obtains the part of the
gray area above the dashed line as well as a fraction ￿ of the dark gray and black areas.
With separate ￿nancing, the creditor obtains the gray area, the upper part of the dark gray
area and a fraction ￿ of the black area. Subtracting, the creditor￿ s returns are higher if
proceeds from the fraction ￿ of the dark gray area, p(1 ￿ p)￿rH, are greater than the sum
of the upper part of the dark gray area and the part of the gray area below the dashed line,
p(1￿p)r. That is, if and only if ￿rH > r. If this condition is satis￿ed by the equilibrium rate
with separate ￿nancing, ￿rH > r￿
i (as in the statement of the proposition), the equilibrium
rate with joint ￿nancing must be lower, r￿￿
m < r￿
i, despite a higher probability of bankruptcy.
Intuitively, creditors obtain higher proceeds from a bankrupt high value project than what
they can charge for separate loans. So, they are forced by competition to o⁄er lower interest
rate. Thus, the borrower obtains a higher expected payo⁄with separate ￿nancing at a higher
interest rate.11
11Note if the distribution of returns was continuous (as in the extension considered in Supplementary
Appendix B), the extra losses from higher probability of bankruptcy if the equilibrium rate with joint
￿nancing were marginally above the crossing point would always be compensated by the increased proceeds
from bankruptcy. Therefore, interest-rate reducing but pro￿t-reducing conglomeration always appears when
the project￿ s returns are continuously distributed, because then there would be no discrete jump in the
probability of bankruptcy at the crossing point (as there is with binary returns).
22III. Heterogeneous Projects
So far, we have assumed that projects are ex ante symmetric. In this section, we extend
the baseline setup to allow for heterogeneity across projects. Project i, i = 1;2, yields
(independent) returns ri
H with probability pi and ri
L with probability 1 ￿ pi. Without loss




H, interchanging the indices if necessary. With
heterogeneous projects, four (rather than three) levels of combined returns are possible,
adding an extra case to the conditions for joint ￿nancing. Now, the possibility arises that
default is avoided if project 1 yields a high return and project 2 a low return, whereas default
is not avoided if the reverse occurs.
A. Financing Conditions
Projects can be ￿nanced separately if they individually satisfy condition (1), as in the
homogeneous case. In the case of joint ￿nancing, there are now three conditions and there
possible rates. As in the baseline setup, there exists r0
m such that bankruptcy can be avoided





















If projects are heterogenous, there exists r00
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Finally, as in the baseline case, there exists r000
m such that bankruptcy cannot be avoided if





















Summarizing the results so far, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5: Two heterogeneous projects can be ￿nanced jointly if and only if conditions
(4), (5) or (6) are satis￿ed.
(a) If condition (4) is satis￿ed, the equilibrium rate is r0
m;
12The precise expression is included in the Appendix, in the proof of Proposition 5.
23Figure 5. Heterogeneous Projects: The dotted and dashed lines depict the cumulative
distribution of returns of two heterogeneous projects, whereas the thick line depicts the distribution
of the average returns of these two projects. The three possible types of rates in joint ￿nancing
correspond to the three ￿ at parts of the thick line. Assuming that the second rate (r00
m) is obtained,
the reduction in expected bankruptcy costs obtained with joint rather than separate ￿nancing (co-
insurance e⁄ect) is equal to the darker gray area whereas the increase in expected bankruptcy costs
obtained with joint rather than separate ￿nancing (risk contamination e⁄ect) is equal to the darker
gray area. The parameters used in the graph are p1 = 0:75; p2 = 0:5; r1
L = 0:5, r2
L = 0:75,
r1
H = 2:5, r2
H = 2:25.
(b) If condition (5) is satis￿ed but (4) is not satis￿ed, the equilibrium rate is r00
m;
(c) If condition (6) only is satis￿ed, the equilibrium rate is r000
m.
The dotted and dashed lines in Figure 5 depict the cumulative distribution of returns of
two heterogeneous projects, whereas the thick line depicts the distribution of the average
returns of the two projects. The three possible types of rates in Proposition 5 correspond to
the three ￿ at parts of the average distribution.
B. Good and Bad Conglomeration
We now turn to the question of whether the borrower should ￿nance the projects jointly or
separately when both ￿nancing regimes are feasible. As in the symmetric case, if a rate that
avoids bankruptcy in both intermediate situations can be obtained (case [a] in Proposition 5),
projects coinsure each other and should be ￿nanced jointly. If the ￿rm can only obtain a
24rate that does not avoid bankruptcy in any of the intermediate situations (case [c]), projects
should be ￿nanced separately because they drag each other down. If bankruptcy can only
be avoided for the more favorable intermediate situation (case [b]), then both coinsurance
and contamination e⁄ects are present at the same time. On the one hand, project 1, when it
yields a high return, saves project 2 when project 2 yields a low return; on the other hand,
project 1, when it yields a low return, contaminates project 2 when project 2 yields a high
return. The optimality of separate or joint ￿nancing depends on whether the gains from
coinsurance dominate the losses from risk contamination.
Proposition 6: When the borrower can ￿nance two heterogeneous projects separately as
well as jointly:
(a) If condition (4) is satis￿ed, it is optimal to ￿nance the projects jointly to enjoy the
coinsurance gains: (1 ￿ p1)p2(1 ￿ ￿)r1
L + p1 (1 ￿ p2)(1 ￿ ￿)r2
L.
(b) If condition (5) is satis￿ed but (4) is not satis￿ed, it is optimal to ￿nance the projects
separately if and only if the risk contamination losses dominate the coinsurance gains: (1 ￿
p1)p2(1 ￿ ￿)r2
H > p1(1 ￿ p2)(1 ￿ ￿)r2
L.
(c) If condition (6) only is satis￿ed, it is optimal to ￿nance the projects separately to avoid
the risk contamination losses: p1(1 ￿ p2)(1 ￿ ￿)r1
H + (1 ￿ p1)p2(1 ￿ ￿)r2
H:
In the new case (b), the probability of default with joint ￿nancing is (i) increased by
(1 ￿ p1)p2, as a successful project 2 would be dragged down if project 1 failed, but (ii)
decreased by p1(1 ￿ p2), as a failing project 2 would be saved if project 1 was successful.
Project 2, however, is saved when it yields a low return but it is dragged down following a high
return. Thus if the two projects have the same probability of success, the risk contamination
e⁄ect always dominates the coinsurance e⁄ect.
The tradeo⁄between coinsurance and risk contamination in the new case (b) is depicted
in Figure 5. The risk-contamination losses, equal to (1 ￿ p1)p2(1 ￿ ￿)r2
L, are represented by
the light gray area and correspond to the added bankruptcy costs on the high-return project
2 that is dragged down when project 1 has a low return. The coinsurance gains, equal to
p1(1￿p2)(1￿￿)r2
H, are represented by the gray area and correspond to reduced bankruptcy
costs on the low-return project 2 that is saved when project 1 has a high return. For the
numerical value used in the ￿gure, it is more pro￿table to ￿nance the projects separately
because the risk-contamination losses are larger than the coinsurance gains.
When projects are heterogeneous, separation has the additional advantage of allowing
25for project-speci￿c loans. We now characterize situations in which it is better to ￿nance
a high-expected return separately rather than jointly with a low-expected return project.
In some cases, separate ￿nancing is optimal even if a rate that avoids bankruptcy for all
intermediate returns can be obtained (condition (4) is satis￿ed).





L = rL and p1 > p2, and only the high-mean project 1 can be
￿nanced separately. Then the borrower should only ￿nance project 1 unless (i) condition (4)
is satis￿ed and (ii) the ex post net present value of ￿nancing the low-mean project 2 separately
is compensated by the coinsurance e⁄ects, i.e., if and only if [(1 ￿ p2)p1 + (1 ￿ p1)p2](1 ￿
￿)rL > 1 ￿ p2rH ￿ (1 ￿ p2)￿rL.
C. Testable Predictions
For the case in which one project is a mean preserving spread of the other, the next result
establishes that more risk typically induces more separation.
Prediction 5: If project 2 second-order stochastically dominates project 1, and therefore
p1 = p2 and r1
H = r2




1￿p1" for " > 0, a higher spread of the risky project
(higher ") leads to a decrease in the region of parameters for which joint ￿nancing is optimal.
As explained after Proposition 6, if the probabilities of success are the same joint ￿nancing
is optimal only if condition (4) is satis￿ed. This condition becomes more stringent as the
spread of the risky project increases. Indeed, the less favorable intermediate returns (r1
L+r2
H)
decrease in the spread of project 1 and the repayment rate (r0
m) increases, as the creditor
recovers less in the event of bankruptcy (when both projects yield low returns). In addition,
it is easier to ￿nance the projects separately as the increase in the high realization of the
return is not compensated by the increase in the repayment rate (ri).
Gorton and Souleles (2005) and Bannier and Hansel (2008) provide evidence on which
banks are more likely to use securitization, a form of separate ￿nancing especially designed to
avoid bankruptcy procedures of separated assets. They show that riskier originator banks are
more likely to securitize. This is consistent with our prediction, which claims that separation
is more likely if the risky project (the bank) is riskier. Evidence on o⁄-balance sheet debt is
also consistent with this prediction as ￿rms with greater credit risks are more likely to use
o⁄-balance sheet debt (Mills and Newberry (2005)).
26For the case in which two projects have di⁄erent probabilities of success, the next result
establishes that higher means typically induces less separation.





L and p1 > p2, for a higher mean of any of the two projects (higher p1
or p2), the region of parameters for which joint ￿nancing is optimal increases.
D. Managerial Implications
In Section II.F we showed that the option with the lowest repayment rate does not need
to result in the lowest likelihood of bankruptcy and it is therefore not necessarily optimal.
Here we show that the ￿nancing option with the lowest probability of bankruptcy might not
be optimal either.
Proposition 8: Separate ￿nancing is optimal even though it results in a higher probability
of bankruptcy if and only if (i) condition (5) is satis￿ed and (4) is not satis￿ed, (ii) the risk-
contamination losses dominates coinsurance gains: (1￿p1)p2(1￿￿)r2
H > p1(1￿p2)(1￿￿)r2
L,
and (iii) the probability of risk contamination is lower than the probability of coinsurance:
p1 > p2.
As shown in Proposition 6, if condition (5) is satis￿ed, we have that (i) if project 1
yields a low return, it drags down project 2￿ s high return (whereas project 2 would have
stayed a￿ oat with separate ￿nancing) and (ii) if project 1 yields a high return, it saves
project 2￿ s low return (whereas project 2 would have defaulted with separate ￿nancing).
Projects should then be ￿nanced separately if the expected bene￿ts from coinsuring the
second project dominate the expected losses from risk-contaminating it. Even when the
second project is more likely to be saved (p1 > p2 and therefore p1(1 ￿ p2) > p2(1 ￿ p1)),
the risk contamination e⁄ect might still dominate because the potential losses from dragging
down a successful project are higher than the potential gains from saving an unsuccessful
one (r2
H > r2
L). Therefore, separation is optimal even if it entails a higher probability of
bankruptcy. Figure 5 is an example in point.
IV. Correlated Projects
To allow for correlation, we now modify the distribution of joint returns for the baseline
case with two identical projects. Suppose that the probability of two high returns result is
27equal to p[1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿)], the probability of two low returns is equal to (1 ￿ p)[1 ￿ p(1 ￿ ￿)],
and the probability that one of the projects yields a high return whereas the other yields
a low one is equal to p(1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿). Thus ￿ is the correlation coe¢ cient between the
two projects. For the joint probability distribution to be well de￿ned, it is necessary to as-
sume that ￿ ￿ maxh￿(1 ￿ p)=p;￿p=(1 ￿ p)i. Clearly, if ￿ = 0 we are back to the baseline
scenario with independent returns.
Prediction 7: If the correlation between the projects increases (￿ is larger), then separate
￿nancing is optimal for a larger set of parameters.
The probability of having two high returns and the probability of having two low re-
turns increase simultaneously with ￿. As a result, the repayment rate when intermediate
bankruptcy is avoided is higher because the probability of two low returns is higher. When
intermediate bankruptcy cannot be avoided, the repayment rate is lower because the proba-
bility of two high returns also increases. As a consequence, the ￿nancing conditions avoiding
intermediate bankruptcy are tighter and those not avoiding it looser.
The e⁄ects of correlation on the optimality conditions are also intuitive. In the extreme
case with perfect negatively correlation (i.e., if ￿ = ￿1 and p = 1=2), when one project
has a high return the other necessarily has a low one, so that projects can always be jointly
￿nanced at a rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy.13 Thus, it is clearly optimal to always
￿nance projects jointly when the negative correlation is perfect. As correlation increases
above ￿ = ￿1, conglomeration is optimal for a smaller region of parameters. If projects
have perfect positive correlation (￿ = 1), the conditions for joint and separate ￿nancing are
identical and the ￿rm is clearly indi⁄erent between them. This prediction is similar to the
one obtained by Inderst and M￿ller (2003) and by Leland (2007).
V. Large Number of Projects
Consider a borrower with access to a large number of identical projects with independent
returns. We show that if the number of projects is su¢ ciently large, it always becomes
possible for the borrower to ￿nance all the projects with a single loan. This result exploits
the law of large numbers. Namely, as the number of projects n increases, the probability
that the average number of projects with high returns di⁄ers from p, the probability of a
13This is not true for p 6= 1=2 because either the probability of two high realizations or the probability of
two low realizations is greater than 0, even when the correlation is at the lowest possible level.
28high return, by more than a small amount " tends to zero. We can then construct a rate o⁄er
to ￿nance all projects jointly that is acceptable for the creditors. The borrower￿ s returns
when ￿nancing all projects jointly is then arbitrarily close to the ￿rst-best as the number
of projects grows large. Therefore, for a large number of projects ￿nancing all the projects
jointly is approximately optimal for the borrower because it yields a payo⁄ that is close to
the highest possible level.
Proposition 9: There exists n0 and q 2 (0;p) such that when the number of projects
satis￿es n > n0, joint ￿nancing of all projects can be obtained at a repayment rate that
avoids bankruptcy when nq projects have high returns. The resulting per-project return
approaches the net present expected value of each project as n grows.
This result leads to our next prediction:
Prediction 8: If there is a large number of independent projects, it is optimal to ￿nance
them jointly.
VI. Non-Proportional Bankruptcy Costs
The analysis so far assumes that bankruptcy costs and recovery rates are proportional
to the realized returns. That is, if the realized returns are given by r, the amount recovered
by the creditor following bankruptcy is given by R(r) ￿ ￿r for ￿ 2 [0;1]. This section
considers the robustness of our results to di⁄erent speci￿cation for bankruptcy costs. First,
we show that if bankruptcy costs are incurred on a per-project basis, independently of the
realized returns, separate ￿nancing then becomes optimal for an even larger set of parameters.
Second, when instead there are economies of scale in bankruptcy costs, we show that the
parameter region for which joint ￿nancing is optimal increases, as is natural to expect.
Proposition 10: Suppose that the bankruptcy costs are incurred on a per-project basis,
independently of the level of returns, rather than on a proportional basis: per-project bank-
ruptcy costs are equal to b, with 0 < b < rL, which means that the recovered returns are
R(r) ￿ r ￿ njb, where nj is the number of projects. Then, separate ￿nancing is optimal for
a larger set of parameters compared with the baseline of proportional bankruptcy costs.
If bankruptcy costs are incurred on a per-project basis rather than on a proportional
basis, the proceeds from a bankrupt high-return project are relatively higher. As a result,
29the rate that does not avoid intermediate bankruptcy, r￿￿
m, is reduced and condition (3)
becomes easier to satisfy. Rates r￿
i and r￿
m, instead, are the same as those resulting with
proportional bankruptcy costs, so that conditions (1) and (2) do not change. As a result,
it becomes easier to obtain joint ￿nancing, but only at the rate for which intermediate
bankruptcy occurs. Therefore, when both separate and joint ￿nancing are feasible, separate
￿nancing is optimal for a larger set of parameters.
Proposition 11: Suppose that there are economies of scale in bankruptcy rather than
constant returns to scale: recovered returns are equal to R(r) ￿ b ￿(r)r, where b ￿(r) 2 [0;1]
is strictly increasing in r. Then, joint ￿nancing is optimal for a larger set of parameters
compared with the baseline of proportional bankruptcy costs.
The introduction of economies of scale in bankruptcy increases the pro￿tability of joint
￿nancing. Due to scale economies, the per-project bankruptcy costs of two projects that are
￿nanced jointly are relatively lower than the bankruptcy costs of a project that is ￿nanced
separately. Suppose for example that the non-proportional bankruptcy costs at rL are the
same as in the proportional case, i.e. b ￿(rL) = ￿. Then, the bankruptcy proceeds in (1) and
r￿
i are the same as in the proportional case whereas the bankruptcy proceeds in (2) and (3)
are higher, so that both r￿
m and r￿￿
m are now lower. Given that it becomes easier to satisfy
condition (2), joint ￿nancing becomes optimal for a larger set of parameters when there are
economies of scale in bankruptcy costs.
VII. Debt, Equity, and Taxes
This section allows the ￿rm to use equity, as well as debt, to ￿nance part of the initial
investment. As in the standard tradeo⁄ theory of capital structure, equity payments are
subject to corporate taxation, whereas debt payments are tax deductible and are therefore
exempt from taxes.
A. Model Extension
Financing for each corporation can be obtained in competitive credit and equity markets.
As in the basic model, the availability of a competitive credit market is equivalent to assuming
that each corporation makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to a single creditor. Corporation j,
consisting of nj projects, promises to repay njr0
j at t = 2 in exchange of njDj at t = 1. Thus,
30the promised per-project repayment r0
j now depends on the part of the initial investment
outlay of each project that is ￿nanced through debt, Dj ￿ 1.
A competitive equity market is equivalent to assuming that each corporation makes a
take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er to a single outside equity investor. We denote the fraction of the
equity sold by corporation j as ￿j, and the equity value of the corporation, if it consists of
nj projects, as njEj. In order to ￿nance all its projects, the sum of debt and equity ￿nancing
per-project must cover the initial investment outlay of each project, Dj + ￿jEj = 1. We
also assume that, while debt payments are tax deductible and therefore exempt from taxes,
equity payments are subject to a corporate tax of ￿, which captures the tax penalty of equity
relative to debt.14
As we argued in Section I, the debt contract is the optimal contractual arrangement
between an investor and the corporation if returns are privately observed by the corporation
and can only be veri￿ed by the investors only by inducing bankruptcy and incurring the
bankruptcy costs. The equity and debt contracts we characterize in this section are also the
optimal contracts under the assumption that equity investors observe returns directly without
the need of incurring veri￿cation/bankruptcy costs, but are subject to higher taxation than
debt, whereas debt investors can only observe the returns by inducing bankruptcy. Thus
our interpretation of the model in terms of costly state veri￿cation remains valid also in the
presence of tax-disadvantaged equity.
B. Financing Conditions
For the case of separate ￿nancing, we now need to distinguish two cases, because there
are situations in which it is possible to obtain a rate r0
i that avoids bankruptcy altogether,
r0
i ￿ rL, by selling a fraction ￿ of the corporation. If this rate exists, it should satisfy
￿(1 ￿ ￿)[p(rH ￿ r
0
i) + (1 ￿ p)(rL ￿ r
0
i)] = ￿Ei and r
0
i = Di:
14Leland (2007) makes the more realistic assumption that only interest expenses are tax deductible. This,
however, creates an endogeneity problem. When interest only is deductible, the fraction of debt service
attributed to interest payments depends on the value of the debt, which in turn depends on the fraction of
debt service attributed to interest payments. Instead of relying in numerical techniques to ￿nd debt values
and optimal leverage, we follow Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991) and assume that both interest and principle
are tax deductible. We also assume away personal taxes.
31Since there is no bankruptcy, the net interest rate is zero and the principal is equal to the
debt value. Substituting into the total ￿nancing condition, Di + ￿Ei = 1, this rate can be




1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[prH + (1 ￿ p)rL]
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ rL: (7)
If the ￿rm uses no equity (￿ = 0), then r0
i = 1 and the condition is never satis￿ed (rL < 1),
as in the baseline debt-only case. But, as more equity is o⁄ered, the debt repayment is lower
(r0
i(￿) is decreasing) and, if taxes are low, the condition can be satis￿ed. Equity, however, is




i) = rL. Still, if taxes are high enough, it is not possible to obtain this
rate, not even by selling all the equity.
Following the same procedure, a rate such that r00




1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)prH ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿rL
[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]p
￿ rH; (8)
which generalizes condition (1) of the baseline setup to ￿ > 0, as r00
i (0) = r￿
i ￿ rH. This
condition is satis￿ed precisely as long as condition (1) is satis￿ed, independently of the level
of equity sold: Given that the ￿rm prefers to sell the lowest possible fraction of equity, no
equity at all is sold in the optimum, ￿00
i = 0: In this case, equity does not help to reduce the
probability of bankruptcy.
The following proposition characterizes which of these two rates is optimally chosen when
they are both available.
Proposition 12: Suppose that both rates r0
i and r00
i are available. There exists ￿i such that
the optimal rate and fraction of equity sold are, respectively, rL and ￿0
i > 0 if ￿ ￿ ￿i, and
r￿
i and ￿ = 0 if ￿ > ￿i.
If taxes are su¢ ciently high, the projects are ￿nanced at the same rate as in the baseline
case without equity. Moreover, it is then optimal to ￿nance the projects entirely with debt.
When taxes are lower, however, it becomes optimal to ￿nance the projects at a rate that
avoids bankruptcy altogether (r0
i(￿0
i) = rL) by selling a positive amount of equity, ￿0
i > 0.
For the case of joint ￿nancing, there are three potential rates. The ￿rst rate, which
avoids bankruptcy altogether, r0
m ￿ rL, is the same as (and can be obtain under the same
circumstances as) the rate resulting with separate ￿nancing, r0
m = r0
i. Indeed, if bankruptcy
can be avoided, then the corporate structure does not matter.
32Second, a rate that avoids bankruptcy if one realized return is high and the other is low




1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿




￿ (1 ￿ p)2￿rL
[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿





which is again a generalization for ￿ ￿ 0 of condition (2) of the baseline case, r00
m(0) = r￿
m ￿
(rH +rL)=2. Again, it is optimal for the ￿rm to choose the minimum amount of equity that
satis￿es condition (9). If condition (2) is satis￿ed, the ￿rm does not need to sell any equity
at all, ￿00
m = 0. If condition (2) is not satis￿ed, this rate can still be obtained, however, by
selling some equity.





1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)2￿rL ￿ 2p(1 ￿ p)￿
rH+rL
2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)p2rH
[1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]p2 ￿ rH; (10)
which again, generalizes the condition of the baseline case for ￿ ￿ 0, i.e. r000
m(0) = r￿￿
m ￿ rH:
As in the highest rate for separate ￿nancing, this condition is satis￿ed precisely as long as
condition (3) is satis￿ed, independently of the equity sold: Given that the ￿rm prefers to sell
the lowest possible fraction of equity, the resulting level is ￿000
m = 0.
Proposition 13: Suppose more than one rate (r0
m, r00
m, r000





(i) If condition (2) is satis￿ed, the optimal rate and fraction of equity sold are, respectively,
rL and ￿0
m > 0 if ￿ ￿ ￿a
m, and r￿
m and ￿ = 0 if ￿ > ￿a
m.
(ii) If condition (2) is not satis￿ed, the optimal rate and fraction of equity sold are, respec-
tively, rL and ￿0




m > 0 if ￿b
m < ￿ ￿ ￿c
m, and r￿￿
m and ￿ = 0 if
￿ > ￿c
m.
C. Good and Bad Conglomeration
The pro￿tability of merging depends on the cases identi￿ed in Proposition 13. In case
(i), merging is always pro￿table at least weakly. This case is equivalent to the case of good
conglomeration in the baseline model. The condition is exactly the same as the condition
enabling the ￿rm to obtain r￿
m in Section II. In case (ii), conglomeration is bad in the
baseline model. And, if taxes are su¢ ciently high, conglomeration is still bad here. If taxes
are lower, however, ￿nancing with equity allows the ￿rm to ￿nance the projects with rates
33that avoid bankruptcy in the case with intermediate returns and even altogether.
Proposition 14: When both separate and joint ￿nancing are feasible:
(i) If condition (2) is satis￿ed, both ￿nancing regimes are equally pro￿table if ￿ ￿ ￿a
m,
whereas joint ￿nancing dominates if ￿ > ￿a
m.
(ii) If condition (2) is not satis￿ed, both ￿nancing regimes are equally pro￿table if ￿ ￿ ￿b
m,
joint ￿nancing dominates if ￿b
m < ￿ ￿ ￿i, and separate ￿nancing dominates if ￿ > ￿i.
In sum, if taxes are su¢ ciently high, only debt is used and the same situation analyzed
in the baseline model arises. That is, joint ￿nancing is pro￿table in case (i) and separate
￿nancing is pro￿table in case (ii). The condition setting apart joint and separate ￿nancing
is exactly the same as in the baseline model without equity. If taxes are intermediate, joint
￿nancing can be pro￿table in cases in which it is not pro￿table in the baseline model with
only debt (case ii). This is because, by ￿nancing jointly, it becomes possible to obtain a
rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy or bankruptcy altogether by using equity. Finally,
if taxes are su¢ ciently low, joint ￿nancing is inconsequential because bankruptcy can be
avoided altogether with joint as well as with separate ￿nancing.
The exclusive use of debt in separate ￿nance is consistent with the many empirical studies
that ￿nd that a disproportionate proportion of funding in project ￿nance is in the form of
debt. Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), for example, ￿nd that projects funded with project
￿nance loans have an average loan-to-project value ratio of 67%. Esty (2003) shows that the
average (respectively median) project company has a book value debt-to-total capitalization
ratio of 70% (respectively 70%) compared to 33.1% (respectively 30.5%) for similar-sized
￿rms.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the simple economics of conglomeration with bankruptcy costs. Our
results qualify the long-standing claim that joint ￿nancing generates ￿nancial bene￿ts by
economizing on bankruptcy costs. By turning on its head the classic logic that generates
coinsurance savings from conglomeration, we characterize instances in which expected bank-
ruptcy costs increase because of risk contamination.
We provide a full and intuitive characterization of the tradeo⁄ between coinsurance and
risk contamination when projects have binary returns. The main predictions we obtain are
the following:
34￿ An increase in the bankruptcy recover rate and an increase in the probability of a high
return favor joint ￿nancing;
￿ An increase in the riskiness of (su¢ ciently negatively skewed) projects favors separate
￿nancing;
￿ An increase in the negative skewness of projects (with su¢ ciently high return) favors
separate ￿nancing;
￿ An increase in the di⁄erences in terms of risk pro￿les of two heterogeneous projects
favors separate ￿nancing;
￿ An increase in the correlation of projects favors separate ￿nancing;
￿ Joint ￿nancing of a su¢ ciently large number of independent projects is optimal.
In addition, we show that separate ￿nancing can be optimal even when joint ￿nancing
involves paying a lower repayment rate or results in a lower probability of bankruptcy.
We conclude by discussing a number of extensions of the model. In our setup, investors
in both projects have recourse to the returns of the other project (with joint ￿nancing) or
none of them have access to the returns of the other (with separate ￿nancing). In reality,
an asymmetric, intermediate situation could also arise whereby investors in one (recourse)
project have access to the returns of the other (nonrecourse) project, but not conversely. In
this case, one of the diagonal entries in Figure 1 would be like the case of separate ￿nancing.
That is, if the project with nonrecourse has a low return and the one with recourse has a high
return, the former would go bankrupt and the latter would stay a￿ oat. In the other diagonal
entry, however, both projects would stay a￿ oat if the recourse project can be saved by the
nonrecourse one. If so, the intermediate solution would be better than separate ￿nancing
but if not, it would be worse. A complete analysis for the resulting tradeo⁄ is left to future
research.
Saving an unsuccessful project might sometimes be optimal for reputational reasons, even
if it has been ￿nanced with (nonrecourse) debt and the ￿rm is under no legal obligation to
save it. Gorton (2008), for example, points out that securitization issuers retain substan-
tial implicit exposure even after mortgages are securitized. In the credit card asset-based
securities (ABS) market, for example, Higgins and Mason (2004) document instances in
which issuers of credit card ABS have taken back non-performing loans despite not being
contractually required to do so. Similarly, Gorton and Souleles (2006) show that prices paid
35by investors in credit card ABS take into account issuers￿ability to bail out their ABS. To
capture this tradeo⁄, one could extend our static model to a dynamic framework.
It is also natural to extend the model to allow for multiple (and possibly risk-averse)
investors. This extension could build on Winton￿ s (1995) result that debt-like contracts with
varying seniority arise as optimal ￿nancial arrangements to economize on the duplication
of veri￿cation costs that are spent by the multiple investors. In this vein, Bond (2004)
analyzes the optimal architecture of intermediation when intermediaries are also subject to
veri￿cation costs, as in Diamond (1984).
From a theoretical perspective, the problem of project bundling analyzed here is closely
connected to the problem of pure product bundling that has been analyzed extensively in the
industrial organization literature (see Adams and Yellen (1976), Armstrong (1999), and Fang
and Norman (2006)). So far the literatures on project and product bundling have developed
in parallel, but departing from opposite premises. For the problem of product bundling,
the naive intuition prevailing before Adams and Yellen￿ s (1976) seminal contribution favored
product separation; hence Adams and Yellen (1976) stressed the somewhat counterintuitive
advantages of bundling products. For the problem of project bundling, instead, the initial
view found the advantages of project bundling more intuitive (Lewellen (1971)); hence we
stress the advantages of separation. In reality, the decision of whether to bundle or separate
is driven by similar forces in the two problems of product pricing and project ￿nancing. As
we argue in Supplementary Appendix B, the reduction in the dispersion of returns induced
by project bundling is similar to the reduction in the dispersion of buyers￿willingness to pay




Proof of Proposition 1: The proof follows from the analysis reported in the text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: If projects can be ￿nanced separately, i.e. condition (1) is satis￿ed,
the entrepreneur obtains a per-project return of p(rH ￿ r￿
i), which is equal to the ex post
net present value
prH + ￿(1 ￿ p)rL ￿ 1: (A1)
Similarly, if condition (2) is satis￿ed, the entrepreneur obtains a per-project return of p2(rH￿
r￿
m) + 2p(1 ￿ p)[(rH + rL)=2 ￿ r￿
m], or
p
2rH + 2p(1 ￿ p)(rH + rL)=2 + ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2 rL ￿ 1; (A2)
and, if condition (3) but (2) is not satis￿ed, she obtains p2(rH ￿ r￿￿
m), or
p
2rH + ￿2p(1 ￿ p)(rH + rL)=2 + ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2 rL ￿ 1: (A3)
Subtracting (A2) from (A1), we obtain (1 ￿ ￿)p(1 ￿ p)rL and therefore joint ￿nancing
is more pro￿table than separate ￿nancing. Instead, subtracting (A1) from (A2), we obtain
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)prH and therefore separate ￿nancing is more pro￿table than joint ￿nancing.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Prediction 1: The statements follow from the fact that the derivatives of the left-
hand of (1), (2), and (3) with respect to ￿ are negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prediction 2: The statements follow from the fact that the derivatives of the left-
hand of (1), (2), and (3) with respect to p are negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prediction 3: Letting " be such that b rH = rH + ", we have that, in order to have a
mean preserving spread, b rL = rL ￿
p
1￿p". Substituting into condition (2), the derivative of







which is positive if and only if p > p, where p ￿
h
1 + 4(1 ￿ ￿) ￿
p
1 + 8(1 ￿ ￿)
i
=2(1 ￿ ￿).
Therefore, condition (2) is less likely to be satis￿ed following an increase in " if and only if
p > p. It can be easily checked that p < 1=2 for any ￿. Q.E.D.
37Proof of Prediction 4: Letting " be such that b rL = rL ￿ ", we have that, in order to have a
mean preserving spread, b p = p ￿
(1￿p)"
rH￿rL+". Following the same procedure as in the proof of
the previous prediction, there exists rH, such that condition (2) is less likely to be satis￿ed
following an increase in " if and only if r > rH. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) Suppose that ￿ and rL are arbitrarily close to 1, condition (2) is
arbitrarily close to
rH+rL
2 > 1 whereas condition (1) simpli￿es to rH > 1. Clearly there are
situations in which condition (2) is satis￿ed, and therefore projects can be ￿nanced jointly,
but condition (1) is not satis￿ed, and therefore projects cannot be ￿nanced separately.
(ii) If condition (2) is not satis￿ed, projects can only be ￿nanced jointly if condition (3)
is satis￿ed. Condition (3) can be rewritten as
prH ￿ p(1 ￿ p)rH(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ p)￿rL > 1:
This implies that prH + (1 ￿ p)￿rL > 1, which implies that projects can be ￿nanced sepa-
rately. Of course, the opposite is not true, if the parameters are such that prH +(1 ￿ p)￿rL
is arbitrarily close to 1, then condition (3) is not satis￿ed. Q.E.D.





1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2 ￿rL
1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2 <





because 1 > ￿rL. Next, suppose that only a rate r￿￿
m above the crossing point can be obtained
and therefore the probability of bankruptcy is higher with joint ￿nancing. Nevertheless, the
rate r￿
m associated with joint ￿nancing is lower than r￿





1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿ (prH + rL)
p2 <













Proof of Proposition 5: Following the same procedure as in the symmetric case, the repay-
ment rate should satisfy 1 < r0
i < ri
H. The creditor￿ s zero pro￿t condition is now
pr
0
i + (1 ￿ pi)￿r
i
L ￿ 1 = 0; (A4)
38and project i can be ￿nanced (at r0










There are three cases in which joint ￿nancing is feasible depending on whether bankruptcy
can be avoided in both cases with intermediate returns, or only when project 1 yields a high
return and project 2 yields a low return, or in neither case. In the former case, competitive
credit markets imply that
[1 ￿ (1 ￿ p1)(1 ￿ p2)]2r
0








￿ 2 = 0; (A6)






































￿2 = 0; (A8)

























































































m is preferred to r000
m. To complete the proof we only need to show that the lower
bound conditions for r00
m and r000































































Proof of Proposition 6: Substituting r0
m in the right hand side of (A6) and r0
i in the right
hand side of (A4) and subtracting the latter from the former, we have
p2 (1 ￿ p1)(1 ￿ ￿)r
1




m in the right hand side of (A8) and subtracting again the ex post
net present value of ￿nancing the two projects separately from this, we obtain
￿(1 ￿ p1)p2(1 ￿ ￿)r
2
H + p1(1 ￿ p2)(1 ￿ ￿)r
2
L;
which can be positive or negative. Lastly, substituting r000
m in the right-hand side of (A9) and
subtracting the ex post net present value of ￿nancing the two projects separately from this,
we have
￿p1(1 ￿ p2)(1 ￿ ￿)r
1




Proof of Proposition 7: If only one project can be ￿nanced separately, we have that pirH +
(1 ￿ pi)￿rL > 1 and pjrH + (1 ￿ pj)￿rL < 1 for i 6= j, where we denote again rH := ri
H
and rL := ri
L for i = 1;2. Then the expected surplus from funding the project separately is
piri
H + (1 ￿ pi)￿ri
L ￿ 1. Subtracting this from the expected surplus from joint ￿nancing in
the case in which the repayment rate r0
m can be obtained and simplifying, we have
pjrH + (1 ￿ pj)￿rL ￿ 1 + [(1 ￿ pj)pi + (1 ￿ pi)pj](1 ￿ ￿)rL:
On the other hand, if we subtract this from the expected surplus from joint ￿nancing in the
40case in which the repayment rate r0
m can be obtained and simplifying, we obtain
pjrH + (1 ￿ pj)￿rL ￿ 1 ￿ [(1 ￿ pj)pi + (1 ￿ pi)pj](1 ￿ ￿)rH;
so that separate ￿nancing is optimal because both terms are negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prediction 5: Given that one project is obtained from an elementary increase in risk
from the other and returns should still be binary, we must have that p1 = p2 ￿ p. Letting " be
such that r1
H = r2




















As shown in the previous proposition, given that the probabilities of success are equal, we
have that, when both projects can be ￿nanced separately as well as jointly, joint ￿nancing
is only optimal if a rate r0
m can be obtained. Moreover, the region for which joint ￿nancing
is optimal shrinks as the repayment rate r0
m is more di¢ cult to obtain if " increases. Indeed,
the left-hand side of condition (A7) decreases in " and the repayment rate (the right-hand
side) increases in ".
On the other hand, the region for which separate ￿nancing is possible expands if "
increases. Indeed, the derivative of the left-hand side of condition (A5) is equal to ￿ whereas
the right hand-side is equal to 1. Hence, this condition is more easily satis￿ed as " increases.
Q.E.D.





that, when both projects can be ￿nanced separately as well as jointly, joint ￿nancing is only
optimal if a rate r0
m can be obtained. The statement follows from the fact that the derivatives
of the left-hand of (A7) with respect to p1 and p2 are negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: Clearly, from Proposition 6, if statements (i) and (ii) are satis￿ed,
separation is optimal. The probability of default of project 1 is the same in both ￿nancing
regimes. With separate ￿nancing, the probability of default of project 2 is (i) reduced by
(1 ￿ p1)p2, as a successful project 2 would not be dragged down if project 1 fails, but (ii)
increased by p1(1 ￿ p2), as a failing project 2 would not be saved if project 1 is successful.
Given that, according to (iii), p1 > p2, we have that p1(1￿p2) > (1￿p1)p2. As a result, the
probability of default with separate ￿nancing is higher. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prediction 7: Clearly, separate ￿nancing is not a⁄ected by correlation. The joint
￿nancing repayment rates, r￿
m and r￿￿
m in Proposition 1, and the corresponding ￿nancing






1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)[1 ￿ p(1 ￿ ￿)]￿rL









1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿rL




m;￿ are respectively increasing and decreasing in ￿. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9: First statement. De￿ne g(￿) := ￿rH + (1 ￿ ￿)rL. We have that
g(p) > 1 because of the positive net present value condition, and trivially g(0) = rL < 1 and
g0(￿) > 0. Then there exists a unique ￿￿ 2 (0;p) such that g(￿￿) = 1. For a ￿xed rational
number " (small) de￿ne q := ￿￿ + ". Clearly, qrH + (1 ￿ q)rL > 1
Take any number of projects n such that nq is an integer number. Suppose that we were
to ￿nance all these n projects jointly at an interest rate that avoids bankruptcy when at




n ￿ qrH + (1 ￿ q)rL:










1 ￿ F(nq ￿ 1)
;
where f(m) and F(m) are the probability density and distribution that m out of the n







m (1 ￿ p)
n￿m and F(m) :=
Pm
k=0 f(k):










From the law of large numbers we have that F(nq) tends to 0 as n grows large (remembering
that q < p). Therefore r￿
n is bounded above by a number that is arbitrarily close to 1. Given
that qrH + (1 ￿ q)rL > 1, there exists n0 such that for all n > n0 then r￿
n is such that
r
￿
n ￿ qrH + (1 ￿ q)rL;
as was to be shown.































Fix a small rational number " and an integer n such that n(p ￿ ") and n(p + ") are integer
numbers. Then, given that q < p ￿ ", and that all terms in the ￿rst and in the second sum
















Given that the terms in the second factor in the sum are larger for larger k, the sum is
reduced by replacing the summand of a given k by that of n(p￿"), the smallest term. Then,
rearranging, we obtain
￿n ￿ [(p ￿ ")rH + [1 ￿ (p ￿ ")]rL][F [n(p + ")] ￿ F [n(p ￿ ")]]:
From the law of large numbers, F [n(p + ")] ￿ F [n(p ￿ ")] tends to 1 as n grows. Indeed
from Chebyshev￿ s inequality we know that
F [n(p + ")] ￿ F [n(p ￿ ")] ￿ 1 ￿
(p + ")(1 ￿ p)
n"2 ￿
(1 ￿ p + ")p
n"2 = 1 ￿
2p(1 ￿ p) + "
n"2
and therefore
￿n ￿ [prH + (1 ￿ p)rL ￿ "(rH ￿ rL)]
￿
1 ￿




That is for n large, the gross per-project pro￿t di⁄ers from the (gross) present value of each






prH + (1 ￿ p)rL
￿￿
1 ￿
2p(1 ￿ p) + "
n"2
￿
where ￿￿ is equal to ￿rst-best gross pro￿ts, ￿￿ = prH + (1 ￿ p)rL. Q.E.D.
Proof of Prediction 8: The proof follows directly from Proposition 9. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10: The bankruptcy proceeds in (1), (2), and (3) (second term of the
numerator of the left-hand side) become respectively (1 ￿ p)(rL ￿ b), (1 ￿ p)
2 (rL ￿ b), and
(1 ￿ p)(p(rH ￿ b) + rL ￿ b), instead of ￿ (1 ￿ p)rL, ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2 rL, and ￿ (1 ￿ p)(prH + rL).
If per-project bankruptcy costs are set at the same level as the fractional losses of the low-
return project, b = (1 ￿ ￿)rL, r￿
i, and r￿
m are the same as those resulting from proportional
bankruptcy costs, so that conditions (1) and (2) do not change. However, the rate r￿￿
m is
43now lower. Thus it becomes easier to satisfy condition (3) because the expected bankruptcy
proceeds are now higher: p(rH ￿ b) + rL ￿ b > ￿ (prH + rL). As a result, it becomes easier
to obtain joint ￿nancing, but only at the rate for which intermediate bankruptcy occurs.
Therefore, when both separate and joint ￿nancing are feasible, separate ￿nancing is optimal
for a larger set of parameters. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 11: The bankruptcy proceeds in (1), (2), and (3) (second term of the
numerator of the left-hand side) become respectively b ￿(rL)(1 ￿ p)rL, b ￿(2rL)(1 ￿ p)
2, and
b ￿(rH + rL)p(1 ￿ p)(rH + rL) + b ￿(2rL)(1 ￿ p)
2 rL, instead of ￿ (1 ￿ p)rL, ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2 rL, and
￿ (1 ￿ p)(prH + rL).
If the increasing bankruptcy costs at the low-return are set at the same level as the
fractional losses, b ￿(rL) = ￿, then r￿
i is the same as that resulting with proportional bank-
ruptcy costs, so that condition (1) does not change. Rates r￿
m and r￿￿
m, on the other hand,
are lower and conditions (2) and (3) are easier to satisfy, as b ￿(rH + rL) > ￿(rH + rL) and
b ￿(2rL) > ￿2rL. Given that it becomes easier to satisfy condition (2), joint ￿nancing becomes
optimal for a larger set of parameters when there are economies of scale in bankruptcy costs.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 12: We proceed by computing the payo⁄ obtained when using each of
the two rates and then we compare the payo⁄s. If the ￿rm uses r0
i(￿) (speci￿ed in (7)), the
￿rm obtains, substituting into (1 ￿ ￿)Ei,
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
[prH + (1 ￿ p)rL ￿ 1]: (A11)
This payo⁄ is decreasing in ￿, as the ￿rm obtains a fraction of the net present value that
corresponds to the (after-tax) equity holding; the remaining part is retained by the govern-
ment through taxes. Therefore the ￿rm should use the smallest level of equity possible. But,
as explained in the text, the ￿rm should use a positive level of equity to satisfy condition





(1 ￿ ￿)[prH + (1 ￿ p)rL ￿ 1 + (1 ￿ rL)]
:
Provided that ￿0
i ￿ 1 (r0
i(￿) can be obtained), the ￿rm obtains, substituting into (A11),
[prH + (1 ￿ p)rL ￿ 1] ￿ ￿p(rH ￿ rL): (A12)
As argued in the text, if the ￿rm uses r00
i (￿) (speci￿ed in (8)), the optimal amount of
44equity is ￿00
i = 0. The borrower then obtains
(1 ￿ ￿)[prH + (1 ￿ p)￿rL ￿ 1]: (A13)
Comparing the payo⁄s in each case, (A12) and (A13), it is optimal for the ￿rm to choose
the ￿rst over the second rate if and only
￿ < ￿i := 1 ￿
(1 ￿ rL)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)rL + (1 ￿ rL)
;
that is if bankruptcy costs (1 ￿ ￿) are high enough and/or taxes are small. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 13: Following the same procedure as in the proof of Proposition 12, we
￿rst compute the per-project payo⁄of the ￿rm when using each of the three types of rate and
then we compare these payo⁄s. If the projects are ￿nanced at a rate that avoids bankruptcy
altogether, r0
m(￿), which is equal to r0
i(￿) (speci￿ed in (7)), the ￿rm gets the same payo⁄ as
in the case of separate ￿nancing, i.e. equal to (A12). As in the case of separate ￿nancing,
the ￿rm needs to use a positive level of equity to obtain this rate, and therefore uses the
minimum amount ￿0
m > 0 such that r0
m(￿0
m) = rL.
If projects are ￿nanced at a rate r00























1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2￿ rH + rL
2
+ (1 ￿ p)
2￿rL ￿ 1 (A15)
if condition (2) is not satis￿ed. If condition (2) is satis￿ed, the ￿rm does not need to use any
equity to obtain r00
m, and therefore ￿00
m = 0 and r00
m(0) = r￿
m. If condition (2) is not satis￿ed,
the ￿rm needs to use a positive level of equity to obtain r00
m, and therefore uses the minimum
amount ￿00





Finally, if projects are ￿nanced at a rate r000




2rH + 2p(1 ￿ p)￿
rH + rL
2




and no equity is used, ￿000
m = 0, as it does not help to reduce the probability of bankruptcy.
We now compare the payo⁄s in each case. Suppose ￿rst that condition (2) is satis￿ed
(part (i) in the statement of the proposition). Then, the payo⁄ when using r00
m is given
by (A14). It can be easily checked that this is always greater than the payo⁄ that can be
obtained when using r000
m, (A16). Comparing the payo⁄s when using r0
m with those of using
45r00
m, r0
m is optimal if and only if
￿ < ￿
a
m := 1 ￿
(1 ￿ rL)
(1 ￿ rL) + (1 ￿ p)2(1 ￿ ￿)rL
:
Suppose second that the condition (2) is not satis￿ed (part (ii) in the statement of the
proposition). Then, the payo⁄when using r00
m is given by (A15). In this case, r0
m is preferred
to r00
m as long as
￿ < ￿
b
m := 1 ￿
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2￿ rH+rL






m is preferred to r000
m as long as
￿ < ￿
c
m := 1 ￿
1 ￿
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)
2￿ rH+rL
2 ￿ (1 ￿ p)2￿rL
1 ￿ p2 rH+rL
2 ￿ 2p(1 ￿ p)￿
rH+rL
2 ￿ (1 ￿ p)2￿rL
;
and r0
m is preferred to r000
m as long as
￿ < ￿
d






2 + (1 ￿ p)2rL
￿
+ (1 ￿ rL)
:




we have the optimal choices claimed in the text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 14: In this proof, we need to compare the payo⁄s of joint and separate
￿nancing. Suppose ￿rst that condition (2) is satis￿ed (part (i) in the statement of the
proposition). If r0
m is used for joint ￿nancing (￿ < ￿a
m), then the payo⁄in joint and separate
￿nancing are the same. If r00
m is used (￿ > ￿a
m), then the payo⁄ in joint ￿nancing is larger
than the payo⁄ of separate ￿nancing.
Suppose now that condition (2) is not satis￿ed (part (ii) in the statement of the propo-
sition). When comparing the cuto⁄s of joint with that of separate ￿nancing, it is easy to
show that ￿b
m < ￿i < ￿c
m. Then, we can compare the payo⁄s in joint and separate ￿nancing.
First, when r0
m is optimal in joint ￿nancing (￿ < ￿b
m), the payo⁄s are the same in sepa-
rate and in joint ￿nancing. When r00
m is optimal in joint ￿nancing (￿b
m < ￿ < ￿c
m), it is
straightforward to check that the payo⁄s are higher under joint ￿nancing if r0
i is obtained
in separate ￿nancing, i.e. ￿ < ￿i, but are lower if r00
i is obtained in separate ￿nancing, i.e.
￿ > ￿i. Finally, when r000
m is optimal in joint ￿nancing (￿ > ￿c
m), joint ￿nancing has lower
payo⁄than separate ￿nancing (in separate ￿nancing r00
i would be optimal because ￿i < ￿c
m).
As in the baseline model, the bankruptcy costs are higher under joint ￿nancing because of
the risk contamination e⁄ect. Q.E.D.
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50OMITTED Supplementary Appendix B:
Continuous Distribution of Returns
The analytical characterization of conglomeration provided in the paper is valid for the
case with binary returns. This appendix analyzes an extension of the model with continu-
ously distributed returns. The purpose of this extension is threefold. First, this extension
allows us to show that the paper￿ s result on bad conglomeration with binary returns are
robust to alternative speci￿cations. Second, by comparing our results with those derived
through numerical simulations by Leland (2007) in a similar setting with continuous re-
turns, we show the occurrence of bad conglomeration that we discover is novel to the ￿nance
literature. Third, in the context of this extension we draw a precise connection with results
derived in the industrial organization literature on product bundling.
To retain analytical tractability for this continuous speci￿cation, the analysis to follow
makes a number of restrictions that are relaxed in the paper for the case with binary returns.
Speci￿cally, we assume that bankruptcy costs are extreme and all project￿ s proceeds are lost
in case or bankruptcy, so that ￿ = 0. In addition, we focus on our baseline scenario with two
identical projects ￿nanced uniquely with debt, and without access to equity. By covering a
special case of the model analyzed by Leland (2007), we are able to argue that our result on
the occurrence of bad conglomeration does not require re-optimizing the capital structure
mix in terms of debt and equity. Furthermore, we assume that the returns of each project are
symmetrically distributed with a log-concave distribution, as depicted for a normal example
in the solid curve in Figure 6.15
If the projects are ￿nanced separately, the probability of bankruptcy for each of them
is equal to the area below the density of returns that lies to the left of the straight line
corresponding to the outstanding debt obligation or gross interest rate, which is equal to the
amount borrowed plus the net interest obligation demanded by creditors. Perfect competition
among risk-neutral creditors drives down this gross interest rate to a level at which creditors
expect to exactly recoup the initial investment outlay.
When the projects are ￿nanced jointly, the relevant distribution is the dashed curve,
representing the distribution of the average returns of the two projects. Note that the
distribution of the average of two identically distributed normals is more peaked around the




Figure 6. Comparison of Bankruptcy Probabilities for Fixed Interest Rate. The
continuous curve represents the probability density of di⁄erent returns when the projects are
￿nanced separately, while the dashed curve represents the density associated to the average
return when the projects are ￿nanced jointly. The vertical line represents the ￿xed interest
rate. The probabilities of bankruptcy associated to separate and joint ￿nancing are equal to
the areas below the density and to the left of the interest rate.
mean than the distribution of individual returns. If the interest rate is held constant at the
initial level, the probability of bankruptcy is reduced provided that the original gross interest
is below the average level of return at which the densities of returns (individual and average)
peak, as shown in the ￿gure. Indeed, given that the probability of bankruptcy is reduced by
joint ￿nancing, creditors are forced to further reduce the gross interest payment, so that the
bankruptcy probability at the ￿nal equilibrium is even lower. This is essentially the logic
that drives Lewellen￿ s (1971) coinsurance bene￿ts from conglomeration.
This result is clearly reversed if instead the original gross interest is above the average
return￿ in this case, the left tail of the distribution is actually higher (rather than lower, as
before) under joint than separate ￿nancing. When the probability of bankruptcy under sep-
arate ￿nancing is more than 50%, this probability is further increased under joint ￿nancing
at the same interest rate prevailing under separate ￿nancing. The possibility then arises that
there exists a rate below the average return at which the projects can be ￿nanced jointly so
that, once the interest rate is endogenized, the probability of bankruptcy is again reduced
52when the projects are ￿nanced jointly. However, this is not the case when the initial distrib-
ution of returns is su¢ ciently dispersed, in which case conglomeration results in an increase
in bankruptcy costs, and thus is unambiguously value-destroying. This Supplementary Ap-
pendix provides easy-to-verify conditions on the distribution of returns that determine the
value of conglomeration in the presence of bankruptcy costs.
As in Section II, we focus on the case in which a cashless ￿rm needs to ￿nance n = 2 ex
ante identical and independently distributed projects with debt only. We now allow returns
to be continuously distributed, but we make the following two additional restrictions to
retain analytical tractability:
1. Per-project returns have a continuous density f(ri) that satis￿es (a) log concavity and
(b) symmetry around the mean ￿.16
2. All returns are lost in case of bankruptcy, ￿ = 0.17
We illustrate our results for the case with normally distributed returns, where ri ￿
N (￿;￿2) for both i = 1;2. Given that there are two projects, the ￿rm can either (i)
￿nance each project separately or (ii) ￿nance the two projects jointly. We proceed by ￿rst
characterizing the conditions for the ￿rm to be able to ￿nance the projects for each of these
two ￿nancing regimes. Second, we examine which of these two ￿nancing regimes generate
most pro￿ts for the ￿rm, when both options are feasible.
A. Financing Conditions
Suppose ￿rst that the ￿rm ￿nances each project separately. In a competitive credit




i [1 ￿ F(r
￿
i)] = 1: (B17)
16A random variable is log-concave if the logarithm of the probability density function is concave. Sym-
metry and log-concavity are satis￿ed by many common parametric densities, such as the uniform, normal,
logistic, Laplace, beta (with a = b) distribution, and any truncations or linear combinations of these distri-
butions.
17Note that if the realized returns are negative, we need to specify whether the creditor is liable when the
company defaults. In this case with ￿ = 0, however, no speci￿cation is necessary because all returns are
destroyed.















where r is the (possibly in￿nite) upper bound of the support of the return distribution.
Given that this is a decreasing function of r￿
i, the ￿rm will select the lowest r￿
i at which
condition (B17) is satis￿ed, if such a r￿
i exists. Financing is obtained in such a case.
Next, consider joint ￿nancing of the two projects within the same company. Denote by
r￿
m the per project repayment in equilibrium, so that 2r￿
m is the total repayment promised to
investors in return for the initial ￿nancing of the two projects, 2I = 2. Following the same
reasoning as before, the ￿rm would select the lowest (if any) per project repayment at which
the creditor￿ s zero pro￿t condition is satis￿ed,
2r
￿
m [1 ￿ G(2r
￿
m)] = 2; (B19)
where G is the distribution function of the sum of two random variables with distribution
F. Noting that the distribution of the sum computed at 2r is







where H is the distribution of the average of r1 and r2, this condition is equivalent to
r
￿
m [1 ￿ H (r
￿
m)] = 1: (B21)
Financing is obtained if an r￿
m that satis￿es equation (B21) exists.
For the example with normally distributed returns, Figure 7 represents the parameters
(standard deviation ￿ on the horizontal axis and mean ￿ on the vertical axis) for which
separate and joint ￿nancing are feasible. Projects above the red curve and below the blue
curve can be ￿nanced only jointly. Projects below the red curve and above the blue curve
can be ￿nanced only separately. Projects below both the red and the blue curves cannot
be ￿nanced either separately or jointly. Projects above both curves can be ￿nanced both
separately and jointly.
B. Separate or Joint Finance?
We now turn to the question of whether separate or joint ￿nancing is more pro￿table for
the ￿rm when both ￿nancing regimes are feasible.
Proposition 15: Assume that the density f is symmetric around the mean ￿ and log-
54Figure 7. Financing and Optimality Regions with Normally Distributed Returns.
Separate (or joint) funding is feasible for (￿;￿) combinations above the blue (or red) curve.
Separate ￿nancing dominates joint ￿nancing for (￿;￿) combinations above the red and blue
curves and below the brown and the pink lines, which depict the two inequalities for optimal
separation.
concave; realizations are independent and the bankruptcy recovery rate is ￿ = 0. If the ￿rm
can ￿nance the projects both separately and jointly, then it should ￿nance them separately if
￿ < 2 and h(￿)￿ < 1=2:
Proof. From Proschan (1965), we know that if two independent random variables have a
log-concave and symmetric density, then the average distribution, which we denote by H, is
more peaked than the distribution of the individual random variable, which we denote by F.
As a consequence, the distribution of the individual random variable and that of the average
cross at r = ￿, and we have
F(r) R H (r) , r Q ￿ (B22)
and as a result
r[1 ￿ F(r)] Q r[1 ￿ H (r)] , r Q ￿: (B23)
If r￿
m, the lowest r such that r[1 ￿ H (r)] = 1, is such that r￿




i exists by assumption, it is not possible that r￿
i < r￿
m because, by (B23) and
concavity of the pro￿t function, we have that for r < r￿
m, r[1 ￿ F(r)] < r[1 ￿ H (r)] <
55r￿
m [1 ￿ H (r￿
m)] = 1. As a result, from (B22) and monotonicity of F, we conclude that the




On the other hand if r￿
m is such that r￿
m > ￿, then r￿
m > r￿
i. Indeed, given that
the creditor￿ s proceeds at r = 0 are equal to 0 and they are higher than 1 at r = r￿
m,
r￿
m [1 ￿ F(r￿
m)] > r￿
m [1 ￿ H (r￿
m)] = 1, by the intermediate value theorem there exists some
r￿
i < r￿
m at which r￿
i [1 ￿ F (r￿
i)] = 1. As a result, from (B22) and monotonicity of H, we have
that the probability of bankruptcy is lower with separate ￿nancing, F(r￿




m is such that r￿
m > ￿ if and only if the following two conditions
hold





> 0 and r[1 ￿ H (r)]jr=￿ < 1;




and ￿ < 2;
as claimed.
For the example with normally distributed returns, ri ￿ N(￿;￿2), the conditions for
separate ￿nancing are
￿ < 2 and ￿ < ￿
p
￿=2:
These conditions identify the region of parameters for which bad conglomeration arises in
Figure 7. In the context of numerical results derived for normally distributed, Leland (2007)
argues that the possibility of bad conglomeration arises because of the endogenous choice
between debt and equity. Instead, our analytical conditions characterizes when bad conglom-
eration arises also when ￿nancing is only through debt. We conclude that bad conglomeration
arises regardless of the endogenous choice between debt and equity, a result that was not
envisioned in Leland￿ s (2007) numerical analysis.
Finally, we turn to the connection between this problem of project bundling and the
problem of product bundling analyzed in a voluminous literature in industrial organization,
pioneered by Adams and Yellen (1978) and recently advanced by Fang and Norman (2006).
A pro￿t maximizing monopolist sells N = 2 indivisible products indexed by i = 1;2. Con-
sumers￿valuation (a.k.a. reservation price) for product i, ri, is distributed as a continuous
random variable with density f(ri) and distribution F(ri). Setting product i￿ s cost to zero for
simplicity, monopoly pro￿ts are equal to revenues. Suppose that products are independent
56in consumption, so that consumers￿valuation for the bundle consisting of the two products
is equal to the sum of the valuations for the component products, r1+r2. Focus on the prob-
lem of pure bundling: Does the monopolist achieve higher pro￿ts selling the two products
separately or jointly?
The maximized pro￿ts achieved by the monopolist with separate products are
pi [1 ￿ F (pi)]; (B24)
where pi 2 argmaxfr[1 ￿ F (r)]g, given that the demand at price p is equal to 1 ￿ F (p).
De￿ning the distribution H(r) of the average of r1 and r2 as in (B20), the maximized per-
product pro￿ts achieved by the monopolist with bundled products are
pm [1 ￿ H(pm)]; (B25)
where pm 2 argmaxfr[1 ￿ H (r)]g is the pro￿t maximizing price for each element of the
bundle. Note that (B24) and (B25) are equal to the left-hand sides of equation (B17) and
(B21) respectively. The parallel between project and product bundling is now apparent.
In light of this connection, Proposition 9 can be seen as a project bundling analogue of
Armstrong￿ s (1999) limit result on the optimality of bundling a large number of products.
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